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by William F. Pedersen, Jr.t
Administrative law, it is said,' has entered an age of rulemaking.
In part, the older agencies have turned to this approach of their own
accord as the burden of existing responsibilities has increased.2 Far
more important, Congress has spurred the trend by creating new
agencies with new responsibilities. These agencies could not possibly
discharge their sweeping mandates to regulate pollution, enery,4 oc-
cupational health and safety,5 coal mine safety and consumer product
safety7 (to give only a few examples) through case-by-case adjudication
in formal hearings. But Congress has not trusted nature to see to it
that rulemaking rather than adjudication is chosen. In many cases,
the regulatory statute explicitly provides that standards shall be set
by rulemaking, though procedural protections exceeding the minimum
required by due process or the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) '
may frequently be specified.
The increased use of rulemaking has changed the whole structure
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1. Most forcibly in Wright, The Courts aud the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of
Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REy. 375 (1974), an article to which this one is much
indebted.
2. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 756-58 (1968); National Petroleum
Ref. Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 690-91 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
3. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623, 84 Stat. 2086, which
became effective on Dec. 2, 1970, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 906 (1970) (creation of the
Environmental Protection Agency).
4. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 761-86 (Snpp. 1975) (creation of the Federal Energy Adninistra-
tion); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (creation of
the Energy Research and Development Administration).
5. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (Supp. III 1973) (granting regulatory powers to the Secretary
of Labor, which led to the creation of the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion). See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1901.01-1999.8 (1974).
6. The responsibility for more stringent coal mine safety standards is divided among
several agencies. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (Supp. III 1973).
7. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (Supp. III 1973) (creation of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission).
8. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (Supp. III 1973).
9. See Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The
Need for Procedural Innovation in Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REy. 1276, 1315-26 (1972).
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of administrative law, for as recently as the early 1960's it was generally
assumed that any significant regulatory scheme would rely to a con-
siderable extent on trial-type hearings.' 0 The shift to rulemaking has
been urged and supported both by commentators and to a surprising
extent by the courts."
The procedures used in rulemaking have not kept pace with these
developments. At present, they provide neither a satisfactory frame-
work for agency decisionmaking nor a structure to those decisions that
would ease judicial review. These weaknesses of the current approach
stem largely from a failure to specify and limit the record on the basis
of which rules are promulgated. If rules, like formal adjudications,
were based on clearly defined records, the efficiency of both rulemak-
ing and judicial review would be increased. Rulemaking procedures
should provide for compiling and organizing an administrative record
while rulemaking is in process, with use of a discovery system to ensure
that no material which properly should be included is left out.
These reforms have been suggested to me by my experience during
the last few years as a lawyer at the Environmental Protection Agency,
and much of the discussion concerns EPA specifically.
I. The Rulemaking Framework
A. The Expanded Scope of Rulemaking
Section 551 of the Administrative Procedure Act divides the agency
actions of interest here into the two categories of "orders"'12 and
10. This, for example, is the clear assumption of Professor Davis throughout the
original four volumes of his Administrative Law Treatise, which were published in
1958. Two other books published during the same period share the assumption that
formal adjudication will continue to be the mainstay of administrative action. See L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965); H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIvE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS (1962).
11. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 698 (2d Cir.
1975) ("over the last decade rule-making has been increasingly substituted for adjudica-
tion as a regulatory technique, with the support and encouragement of courts, at least
where the regulation involves specialized scientific knowledge"); National Petroleum
Ref. Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 681-84 (D.C. Cir. 1973); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
359 F.2d 624, 630-31 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966); 1 K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 6.15, 6.18 (Supp. 1970); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE 65-68 (1969); H. FRIENDLY, supra note 10, at 142-46; Shapiro, The Choice of Rule-
making or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. R~v.
921, 922 & n.1 (1965). See also Recommendation 72-5 of the Administrative Conference
of the United States, 1 C.F.R. § 305.72-5 (1975) (adopted Dec. 14, 1972).
12. An "order" is "the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative,
negative, injunctive or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other thawi rule
making." 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (Supp. III 1973).
One might argue from the text of these definitions that anything an agency does
which is "final" and is not rulemaking must be adjudication. This is supported by
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"rules."' 13 The two most common types of agency proceedings, produc-
ing orders and rules respectively, are known as formal adjudication
and informal rulemaking.
14
Formal adjudication involves a quasi-judicial hearing before an ad-
ministrative law judge; 1 witnesses appear for both sides and are usu-
statements in the APA's legislative history that 5 U.S.C. § 551(12), which defines "agency
proceeding" to include all forms of rulemaking and adjudication, was meant to "assure
that all forms of administrative procedure or authority are included." SENATrE JUDICIARY
CoMiM., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT: LEGISLATIVE HIsroRY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 255 (1946) (quoting from report of the House Judiciary Comm.); S. Doc. No.
248, supra at 197-98 (quoting from report of the Senate Judiciary Comm.).
On the other hand, "agency action" is defined by § 551(13) in even broader terms than
those used to describe "agency proceeding," and is the subject of even more expansive
language in the legislative history. S. Doc. No. 248, supra at 198, 255. The APA provides
for judicial review of any "final agency action," 5 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. III 1973), and this
language has been read by Judge Friendly to authorize judicial review of an "action"
which he apparently regarded as neither a "rule" nor an "order." See United States cx
rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371, 375 n.2 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 929 (1969).
The question is largely if not entirely semantic, howe er, since the only way the two
terms "rulemaking" and "adjudication" can be made to account for all "final" agency
actions is by hypothesizing a residual category of "informal adjudication" (5ce note 14
infra) which is not rulemaking and not subject to the formal adjudicatory hearing re-
quirements of 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 and 557. The Administrative Procedure Act la)s down
no separate rules for "informal adjudications," and so the presence or absence of that
label has no operational effect.
The Supreme Court has recently reconfirmed that agency actions which are not "final,"
but which represent an intermediate stage in a chain of events that may culninate in a
more formal proceeding, are not subject to the requirements of the APA. See ITT v.
Local 134, IBEW, 419 U.S. 428, 442-44 (1975).
13. A "rule" is "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (Supp. III 1973).
14. Both rulemaking and adjudication can be either "formal" or "informal." As a
practical matter, however, "formal" rulemaking is rarely called for, while "informal"
adjudication is a catchall category covering a multitude of "final" agency decisions which
do not fit anywhere else and which have no common theme or pattern.
Agencies take a great many actions by means which often do not meet even the
standard of formality established for informal rulemaking. Some examples would be
the decision to issue a complaint, start an investigation, fund a highway, order a
drug label changed, or write an environmental impact statement. Professor Davis has
estimated that up to 80 or 90 percent of agency actions may fall in this category.
1 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TRATISE § 4.13, at 206 (Supp. 1970). Since these ac-
tions may or may not be "final," they would not necessarily be classified as "in-
formal adjudications" under the approach outlined in note 12 above, because onl) a
"final" action can be any kind of an "adjudication" within the meaning of the AP'A.
Nevertheless, according to Professor Davis, "the ratio of informal adjudication to fornal
may be fifty or a hundred to one." K. DAVIS, DIScRrIONARY JusTIcE 21 (1969). However,
he regards actions which are not final at all-interim decisions on "initiating, investiga-
ting, prosecuting, negotiating, settling, contracting, dealing, advising, threatening, pub-
licizing, concealing, planning, recommending. supervising"-as more important still. Id.
at 22. Such actions individually and collectively may be of great importance and la,.e been
the focus of increasing attention by courts and legal scholars in recent years. But
recognition of them does not diminish the tremendous significance of formal adjudica-
tion and informal rulemaking.
15. The original Administrative Procedure Act established a class of govermnent
employees called "hearing examiners" who would preside in formal administratie hear-
ings. Although they are assigned to individual agencies, their tenure and promotion are
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ally cross-examined extensively, generating a record in the familiar
courtroom manner.1" The statutory requirements for informal rule-
making, by contrast, are limited. The agency must publish in the
Federal Register17 "the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved,""' receive comments
from "interested persons," and publish the final regulations, incor-
porating a "concise general statement of their basis and purpose."'19
The APA does not make these minimum procedures exclusive,20 and
does not attempt to define a record for agency decision.
Many agency decisions fit under the APA definitions of both "rules"
and "orders" and therefore could legitimately be made either through
informal rulemaking or through adjudication. Where both approaches
are authorized by the particular regulatory statute and either is con-
stitutionally permissible, the choice between them is in large part left
to the agency.2'1 Recently, the range of cases in which an agency may
choose rulemaking instead of adjudication has been greatly broadened.
The traditional view was that the constitutional right of a regu-
lated party to an adjudicatory hearing turned on the type of ad-
ministrative action in question. For over 60 years it has been es-
tablished that some administrative actions which verge on the "ju-
within the sole control of the Civil Service Commission as a protection against pressure.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(b), 3105, 5362, 7521 (Supp. III 1973). The title of these officials was
changed to "Administrative Law Judge" by regulation in 1972. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 930.201-
930.215 (1974), incorporating amendments from 37 Fed. Reg. 16787 (1972). This change in
title does not denote any alteration of their functions.
16. With some variations, this is also the procedure used for "formal" rulemaking.
17. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (Supp. III 1973). Service of notice on the affected parties may
be substituted for publication. Id.
18. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (Supp. III 1973).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (Supp. III 1973).
20. For this reason, the proposals that will follow could be partially adopted by
unilateral action within the agencies. But since procedural reform has an understand-
ably low priority in the most active agencies, and since it is also necessary to make
the reforms bind others besides the agency, these proposals should be considered pri-
marily as suggestions for legislativ e action. The suggested procedural reforms could,
however, also be required by the courts. In recent years the D.C. Circuit, at least, has
been very free in establishing new procedural requirements for informal rulemaking,
generally in the exercise of a supervisory power over the agencies which it has grounded
only loosely, if at all, in any specific statutory or constitutional provisions. Thus, in
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972), Judge Leventhal
required a more detailed statement of the basis and purpose of the regulations in "the
interest of justice ... and in aid of the judicial function" of review. In Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974),'
he simply said that it was "not consonant with the purpose of a rule-making proceeding"
to base rules on inadequate or undisclosed data. See Wright, supra note 1, at 381-88
(acknowledgment and criticism of this trend).
21. "[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc
litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
agency." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (Chenery II). "[T]he choice be-
tween rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the [administrative
agency's] discretion." NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
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dicial" cannot constitutionally be taken without offering an adju-
dicatory hearing to those affected. Where this type of action is federal,
the formal hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act
probably apply. 22 But in cases involving administrative actions which
seem more "legislative," there has been no such hearing requirement.2 3
In recent years, the notion that the availability of an adjudicatory hear-
ing should depend solely on whether the action the agency is taking has
a legislative, future-oriented character has for the most part, in Judge
Friendly's phrase, "gone to a deserved repose."2- Instead, various other
tests have been debated, turning alternatively on the kinds of facts at
issue, the sorts of rights involved, the number of people affected, or
the administrative scheme at issue and what it can tolerate.
2
5
During the past decade, the courts have used the latitude left them
by the number and unsettled priority of these tests to pare down any
right to an adjudicatory hearing in complicated regulatory programs. 20
22. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950) (APA held applicable to deporta-
tion proceedings conducted by the Immigration Service). Wong Yang Sung has not
always been followed, but it was cited with approval in ITT v. Local 134, IBEW, 419
U.S. 428, 431, 438, 448 (1975). See also United States v. Allegheny-Ludlumn Steel Corp.,
406 U.S. 742, 757 (1972); 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 1.04, at 30 n.25
(1958). However, to the extent that recent cases have adopted a "flexible" interpretation
of due process, under which the type of procedure required varies with the nature of the
controversy and the interests at stake, the rigid adoption of full formal hearing re-
quirements which Wong Yang Sung would require is inevitably called into question.
See note 26 infra.
23. The opinions generally cited as first establishing the distinction between types
of action are Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 378 (1908) (hearing required for property
assessment where assessment based on the effect of public improvements on individual
property values), and Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,
445-46 (1915) (Holmes, J.) (no hearing required for general increase in valuation of
taxable property).
24. Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 300-01 (2d Cir. 1971). But cf.
United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 242-46 (1973); United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 757 (1972).
25. See Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250, 1266-68 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 2620 (1975); 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 6.05, 7.02-.04 (1958);
2 id. § 15.03; Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rule-
making and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485,
503-05, 520-25 (1970); Note, The Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements for
Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARV. L. REV. 782, 786-90 (1974).
26. Interestingly, this has taken place at the same time as a great expansion in the
right to such a hearing prior to governmental deprivation of personal entitlements in such
things as welfare benefits, parole, or goods bought oIl credit. See, e.g., North Georgia Fin-
ishing, Inc. v. Di-Chein, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (garnishment of corporation's bank ac-
count); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation of parole); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment of wages). Even here, however, some of the latest decisions
imposing additional procedures require only brief notice and informal hearing and
specifically reject any per se rights to summon or cross-examine witnesses or haic the
assistance of counsel. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1975) (suspension of public
school students); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison disciplinary proceed-
ings). For a general discussion of the need for flexible hearing requirements, see Friendly,
"Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
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The facts at issue and interests involved have been characterized almost
uniformly against such claims.27 Indeed, even where the governing
statute explicitly prescribes an administrative hearing, courts have in-
creasingly read it to require only a legislative-type proceeding, without
a formal presiding officer, a formal record or opportunity for cross-
examination.
2s
Finally, even where an adjudicatory hearing concededly is required
by statute before a given action may be taken, the courts have sus-
tained the use of summary. judgment procedures, under which the
right to an adjudicatory hearing is conditioned on a threshold showing
that substantial factual issues will be raised.20 The combination of
these tendencies, together with the marked congressional trend to rule-
making, has in recent years tipped more and more important agency
actions down the scale from formal adjudication to informal rule-
making. 30
27. In both Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973), and South
Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974), regulatory actions by EPA were
held to be rulemaking and not to require an adjudicatory hearing even though only one
source of pollution, owned by a single company, would be affected. The court in
Anaconda pointed to the wide range of interested persons and to the potential for
delay. 482 F.2d at 1307. The court in South Terminal added that the purpose of the
rule at issue was the "legislative" one of setting policy, not singling out an individual
for punishment, and that the facts behind it were not "adjudicative." 504 F.2d at 660-61.
See also Note, supra note 25, at 786 & n.24.
Claims to a de novo, trial-type hearing before the reviewing court, rather than be-
fore the agency, have suffered the same fate. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141 (1973);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
28. See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 236-37, 241 (1973), and
the discussions of that case in Friendly, supra note 26 at 1305-10, and Verkuil, Judicial
Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185, 195-96 (1974). However, in some
cases where such a hearing was desired, the courts, though ruling out claims as of right
to a full range of formal procedures, have suggested that limited cross-examination
might be required upon an appropriate showing of need. See O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491
F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974); American Airlines v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 632-33 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
For a recent study concluding that the right of limited cross-examination so conferred
has been little used and has proved of little benefit, see Williams, "Hybrid Rule-Making"
Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. Cn. L.
Rav. (1975; forthcoming) [citations are to a draft on file with Yale Law Journal] (a
report to the Committee on Judicial Review of the Administrative Conference of the
United States).
29. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 620-22 (1973);
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956).
Judge Leventhal has suggested that even where the issues are too nuclear to allow an
open-and-shut summary judgment procedure to be invoked, the agency, despite the
statute, may in some cases legitimately grant a hearing that falls short of what the APA
specifies for full-scale adjudications. See Cooper Laboratories, Inc. v. Commissioner, FDA,
501 F.2d 772, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
30. However, in addition to their willingness to scale down more formal types of
proceedings into notice and comment rulemaking, the federal courts have displayed a
new willingness to scale up less formal actions into the same category. Elimination of
any notice and comment period is authorized for "interpretative rules, general state-
ments of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice," 5 U.S.C. §
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This result, some commentators argue, has been accomplished at
the expense of respect for precedent and legislative history." Yet the
reasons why the courts strained to reach it are readily understood.
During the 1960's, such administrative horror stories as the peanut
butter case ".2 highlighted the dangers of undue formality in adminis-
trative proceedings. Subsequent scholarship has shown that use of ad-
judicatory hearings and, in particular, exhaustive probing of indi-
vidual facts through cross-examination is self-defeating in complicated
regulatory programs
a3
553(b)(A) (Supp. II1 1973), and, of course, is not required for those actions which are not
"rules" at all. Nonetheless the courts seem to be increasingly willing to impose the notice
and comment requirements of § 553 to actions which are arguably of these types. Sec
Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112-14 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 398 n.91 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Hamilton, supra
note 9, at 1314 n.175 ("courts have been suspicious of rules promulgated without the
opportunity for comment"). See also Wright, supra note 1, at 375 & n.l.
31. See Friendly, supra note 26, at 1305-10; Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the
Administrator: Hearing Variations and Standards of Judicial Review under the Ad-
7ninistrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 721, 768
(1975) ("It must be obvious by now that I regard these [developments], whether already
achieved or only anticipated, as distortions of the original meaning of the APA, especially
if the Act is interpreted in accordance with the conventional administrative law wisdom
generally accepted at the time of its enactment."); Williams, supra note 28, at 59-62.
32. This mammoth formal hearing involved the question how high a peanut content
a mixture of oil and peanuts would have to have before it could be called "peanut
butter." See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 698 n.8 (2d
Cir. 1975) ("The notorious proceeding which established standards of identity for peanut
butter lasted more than 10 years."); J. GOULDEN, THE SUPERLLWYERS 185-89 (1971);
Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1287-88.
33. According to Professor Hamilton:
The actual agency experience with [formal rulemaking] requirements raises serious
doubts about their desirability. At best, some agencies have learned to live with
them, even though preferable procedures are probably available. At worst, these
procedures have warped regulatory programs or resulted in virtual abandonment of
them.... [T]he primary impact of these procedural requirements is often not ... the
testing of agency assumptions by cross-examination, or the testing of agency con-
clusions by courts on the basis of substantial evidence of record. Rather these
procedures either cause the abandonment of the program .... or the promulgation
of noncontroversial regulations by a process of negotiation and compromise ....
Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1312. Upon examining the subsequent history of three cases
in which the courts had granted a limited right of cross-examination in connection with
rulemaking, Professor Williams discovered that
cross-examination was traded away or abandoned by parties in two of the three cases
where the courts insisted on its availability,... and in the third...it cannot be
said to have played a critical role in building the challengers' record for appeal.
Williams, supra note 28, at 48. In view of the apparent lack of utility of cross-examina-
tion in actually helping to analyze the merits of a proposed rule, Professor Williams
suggests some other reasons why a right of cross-examination in rulemaking is so often
requested. He points out that such a right, when conferred, creates a potential for delay,
grants the regulated parties a bargaining chip and a source of pressure for more lenient
regulation, may chill the willingness of experts to work for the agency and "may score
points whose value is more apparent than real," particularly in the cross-examination of
experts. Id. at 39-40. He recommends that any such right of cross-examination be most
severely restricted.
Judge Friendly also has been a source of adverse comment on the absolute right of cross-
examination. See Friendly, supra note 26, at 1283-85. Judge Friendly described as follows
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B. Judicial Review of Informal Action
1. The Availability of Review
In the absence of another specific statutory provision, jurisdiction
to review the actions of federal agencies lies in the federal district
courts.3t Almost invariably, however, particular regulatory statutes
establish circuit courts of appeals as alternative forums for initial re-
view, at least of some actionsY5 District court review is increasingly
held to be unavailable where review at a higher level is provided.3 6
Often an agency's governing statute restricts circuit court review to
"orders." "Order," like "rule," is of course a term of art used in the
APA to describe the product of a particular process. But the terms
"rule" and "order" in a governing statute have not always been read
to harmonize with the APA's usage. Hence, in the past, it was fre-
quently unclear whether a given APA rule fit within the definition
of an "order" as the latter term was used in the relevant judicial
review provision, and thus whether the rule" could be reviewed prior
to its enforcement.3 7 This reflected the generally confused state of
his experience in reviewing FDA formal rulemaking which established standards of
identity and labeling requirements for vitamins:
The agency hearing transcript comprised more than 32,000 pages and the material
sent us, consisting of selected portions of the record, filled three feet of shelf space.
The use of trial-type procedures had been of little avail; cross-examination of
government witnesses, which filled some 60% of the pages devoted to the Govern-
ment's presentation, yielded precious few admissions or other statements of any
significance. Ironically, the hearing examiner had denied cross-examination in the
one instance where it might have been most useful.
Friendly, supra note 26, at 1306 n.199, discussing National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v.
FDA, 504 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974), cart. denied, 420 U.S. 946 (1975).
-34. Jurisdiction is conferred on these courts either by the general federal question
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. III 1973), or in some cases by the Mandamus and Venue
Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). Jurisdiction may also be conferred by the judicial
rev iew provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. 111 1973), but the courts of appeals
are divided on that question. Compare Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1101-02 (2d
Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974), with Pickus v. United States
Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1109-10 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
35. See Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest
for the Optimum Foruin, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 5 & nn.12-18, 40 n.154 (1975). Among the
agencies whose statutes contain such a provision are the EPA, 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. III
1973), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (1970); FCC, 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (1970), 47 U.S.C. § 402 (Supp.
III 1973); FPC, 15 U.S.C. § 717n(b) (1970); FTC, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970); NLRB, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(e), (f) (1970); NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board), 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1970);
OSHA (Occupational Health and Safety Administration), 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (Supp. III
1973).
36. See Verkuil, supra note 28, at 200 & n.68.
37. Compare Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942) (review
granted), wvith United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 181 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 827 (1950) (review denied). The reason given for declining to review the product
of informal rulemaking in the latter case was that by limiting judicial review to orders
formulated after formal proceedings, Congress had recognized that "an appellate court
has no intelligible basis for decision unless a subordinate tribunal has made a record
fully encompassing the issues." 181 F.2d at 799.
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the law on whether a given controversy was clearly enough defined
and immediate enough to be ripe for judicial review.38 Under current
interpretations of the words "order" and "ripeness," early judicial
review of rules has now become routinely available. In Abbott Lab-
oratories v. Gardner,3 the Supreme Court held that an administrative
decision was ripe if it "has been formalized and its effects felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties. ' 40 "Order" has likewise been
redefined in a series of cases to refer less and less exclusively to the
product of adjudicatory proceedings.41 Increasingly, the result has been
early judicial review of rules by the courts of appeals, outside the
limiting context of a specific enforcement proceeding and without the
structuring influence of a prior formal hearing either before the
agency or before a district court.42
2. The Standard of Review
The Administrative Procedure Act provides three tests which po-
tentially might be used to review findings of fact made in the course
38. For a description of the law as it was a few years ago, see 3 K. D.vis, ADMINISTRAL-
TIvE LAW TREATISE §§ 21.01-21.10 (1958).
39. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
40. Id. at 148-49. The context makes clear that reasonably anticipated future effects
are "felt in a concrete way." Professor Davis has supplemented his treatise with a dis-
cussion of the recent clarification of "ripeness" law. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw
TREATISE § 21.00 (Supp. 1970).
41. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 227 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 1005 (1956) (rate filing suspension held to be "order" dcspite lack of hearing,
record or findings); Verkuil, supra note 28, at 196-205. In a recent case on the interpre-
tation of "order," Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
the court said that "in recent years the courts have been more inclined to accept juris-
diction over rules as well as administrative orders" and added that the trend of the cases
was to "eliminate the arbitrary distinction .. .between adjudicative orders and other
agency pronouncements" as far as reviewability was concerned in favor of "a more prac-
tical analysis, concentrating on whether the issues and the record were suitable for
judicial review and whether the agency's order had an immediate and significant impact
on petitioners."
42. This development, too, has been said to go against legislative history:
Section 553's notice-and-comment prQvisions were [originally] conceived of as instru-
ments for the education of the administrator, especially on questions of policy; there
is not the slightest indication that the purpose of the notice-and-comment proceed-
ing was to develop a record by which a reviewing court could test the validity of
the rule which the Administrator finally adopted.
Apparently, an underlying assumption of the APA draftsmen was that any factual
issues which became pertinent in a challenge to the validity of a section 553 rule
would be resolved in the first instance in judicial proceedings-either in enforcement
proceedings or in suits to enjoin enforcement. It must also have been assumed that
such proceedings would take place in the first instance in a federal district court-a
court accustomed to resolving such factual questions even if it might, in some in-
stances, be a three-judge court.
Nathanson, supra note 31, at 754-55 (footnotes omitted).
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of rulemaking. Such findings and conclusions, the statute provides,
may be set aside when found to be
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law; ...
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to [5
U.S.C. §§] 556 and 557 . . . or otherwise reviewed on the record
of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.4 3
As a practical matter, the question of which test should be applied
in judicial review of informal rulemaking was settled by the Supreme
Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,44 even
though that case did not actually involve informal rulemaking. In
reviewing the decision of the Secretary of Transportation to allow
a highway to be built through a public park,4 5 the Court rejected
both substantial evidence and trial de novo review in favor of a
determination whether the decision at issue could be said to be ar-
bitrary or capricious.46 The Court cautioned, however, that despite
43. The remainder of the APA section specifying the standard of judicial review of
agency action reads as follows:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The
reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be-
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short
of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or
those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of
prejudicial error.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. III 1973). Tests (B), (C) and (D) are confined to straightforward
matters of law, and within their limits presumably apply equally to review of rulemaking
and of administrative adjudication.
44. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
45. The Secretary's decision is an example of administrative action which is less
formal than informal rulemaking. See note 14 supra.
46. The substantial evidence test, the Court said, was not applicable because the
hearing required by the statute before approval for construction of the highway could
be given was
nonadjudicatory, quasi-legislative in nature. It is not designed to produce a record
that is to be the basis of agency action-the basic requirement for substantial-
evidence review.
401 U.S. at 415. But see Note, Judicial Review of the Facts in Informal Rulemaking: A
Proposed Standard, 84 YALE L.J. 1750, 1752, 1756 (1975) (arguing that the language of
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the adoption of what seemed to be the least stringent of the three
APA tests, the reviewing court would have to undertake a "searching
and careful" inquiry into the facts, and would also have to consider
"whether the decision [under review] was based on a consideration
of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment."'47
The circuit courts have almost universally reacted to Overton Park
by adopting the arbitrary or capricious test for review of informal rule-
making.48 The invitation to make a searching and careful inquiry into
the facts also has been enthusiastically accepted. The result has been
the APA requires substantial evidence review of factual determinations in informal rule-
making, despite its nonadjudicatory, quasi-legislative nature). As for trial de noio, the
Court said that it is
authorized . . . in only two circumstances. First, such de novo review is authorized
when the action is adjudicatory in nature and the agency factfinding procedures
are inadequate. And, there may be independent judicial factfinding when issues that
were not before the agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory
agency action .... Neither situation exists here.
401 U.S. at 415 (citations omitted).
47. 401 U.S. at 416. The Court did caution, however, that the district court "is not
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Id.
48. See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 655 (1st Cir. 1974); Buckeye
Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 171 (6th Cir. 1973); Delaware Citizens for Clean Air,
Inc. v. Administrator U.S. EPA, 480 F.2d 972, 975-96 (3d Cir. 1973) (the substantial
evidence test is not applicable because no decision on the record of a hearing is re-
quired); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 505 (4th Cir. 1973). Contra, Texas
v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 296-97 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1974). In Texas, the court was betrayed
by Overton Park into making the unfortunate statement that if EPA's action had been
rulemaking, the applicable standard of review would be substantial evidence rather than
arbitrary or capricious. EPA's action was in fact rulemaking.
The shift away from the substantial evidence standard has occurred even though the
Court in Overton Park stated explicitly that "[r]eview under the substantial-evidence
test is authorized only when the agency action is taken pursuant to a rulemaking
provision of the Administrative Procedure Act itself, 5 U.S.C. § 553 .... ." 401 U.S. at
414. This statement does not square with the view expressed a page later in the opinion
that the substantial evidence test only applies where a hearing is held that is "designed
to produce a record that is to be the basis of agency action." See note 46 supra. In
rulemaking under § 553 there is no statutory requirement for either record or hearing.
See Verkuil, supra note 28, at 212 (first Overton Park statement is "unfortunate dictum").
In practice, however, the circuit courts have completely ignored the first statement, in-
stead adopting the arbitrary or capricious test to review of agency rulemaking.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has apparently applied the substantial
evidence test to judicial review of informal rulemaking in several cases after Overton
Park, though without discussing the point. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel
Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 671
(1972); Note, supra note 46, at 1756-58.
Whatever the label used, this new approach marks a significant change from the one
taken when rules were less important forms of agency action than they are now, and
judicial review of them was less freely available. In those days rules rarely dealt with
complicated factual subjects, and the conventional wisdom was that due to their "legisla-
tive" nature they were little more subject to factual review than statutes. See, e.g.,
Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935) (Brandeis, J.); Verkuil,
supra note 28, at 206-07. The reasons for the change are well expressed in Chicago
v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 741-43 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
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to transform the arbitrary or capricious test into something very close
to substantial evidence review.49
Such a development was probably inevitable given the complexity
of the problems now being addressed by rulemaking. Distinctions be-
tween degrees of inquiry tend to evaporate in the face of highly
technical and novel factual issues and the complex web of intellectual
and policy choices in which they are often embedded, a web which
may make two or three or many different approaches intellectually
defensible. 5° Any standard of review of the substantive merits of an
action requires a court to understand those merits, and when a new
and complex rule is being considered, the mere effort which must
be exerted to do that will translate itself almost automatically into a
fairly rigorous probing and exposure of what the agency has done.
However, this more rigorous judicial scrutiny has been accompanied
in some areas by a relaxation of the factual showing the agency ulti-
mately must make before its rules will be sustained. The tremendous
uncertainties that may surround the consequences of actions in the
spheres in which the Environmental Protection Agency and some
other agencies operate have led the courts to moderate any require-
ment that regulations be supported by "proof" in some hard and fac-
tual sense. Rather than show that harm will occur if a given action
is not taken, the agency simply is required to show that a risk of harm
49. See Note, supra note 46, at 1753-56. Several judges have noted the tendency of
these two tests to converge. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512
F.2d 688, 705 (2d Cir. 1975) (Lumbard, J., concurring) ("In essence I think that when an
agency engages in substantive rule-making, it abuses its discretion (or acts arbitrarily or
capriciously) if its actions are not supported by substantial evidence."); Synthetic Organic
Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir. 1974); Associated Indus. v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.); Bunny
Bear, Inc. v. Peterson, 473 F.2d 1002, 1005-06 (Ist Cir. 1973); Leventhal, Environmental
Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 540-41 (1974).
Cases under the judicial review provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970), which provide that rules will be affirmed if they meet a
substantial evidence test even though the rulemaking proceedings are informal, have
been cited and relied on by courts as they reviewed other rules and simultaneously
applied the arbitrary or capricious standard. Thus, Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson,
499 F.2d 467, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974), an OSHA case, was cited and relied on in Amoco
Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 739-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974), and relied on indirectly in South
Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 655 n.6 (1st Cir. 1974), cases arising under the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (Supp. III 1973).
For another illustration of this convergence, compare Chrysler Corp. v. Department of
Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 667-68 (6th Cir. 1972) (substantial evidence), with Boating Indus.
Ass'n v. Boyd, 409 F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1969) (arbitrary or capricious), and Automotive
Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (same).
50. See Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving
Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social issues, 71 Micn. L. REv. 111, 116-20 (1972). See
generally Wright, supra note 1, at 388-89.
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will be generated, and that this risk is substantial enough to justify
a given -regulatory response.51
This development has been recognized.52 But a corollary has not.
Whatever the nominal standard of review applied, courts have been
on notice, since the decisions of the Supreme Court in Morgan v.
United States,5- not to "probe the [actual] mental processes"' 4 of the
decisionmaker by cross-examination or disclosure of briefing materials.
Instead, they are limited to an inquiry whether the decision makes
sense in terms of the applicable legal criteria, the material formally
considered in making it, and the reasons formally given. The only sig-
nificant exception to that rule arises where a "strong [preliminary]
showing of bad faith or improper behavior" has been made. 55 Then,
"the courts will inquire into the administrative process in order to
insure that the decision making was informed, unbiased, and [to the
extent required by law] personal."5 6
The greatly increased scope of the subjects addressed by rulemaking
and the development of a more flexible burden of proof do not affect
the Morgan bar directly. But to the extent that they expand the au-
thority of the agency and carry with them a potential for abuse, they
increase pressures either for more formal procedures or for fuller in-
quiry into the actual workings of the administrative process itself.
C. The Neglect of Procedure
The developments outlined above contain a paradox. Judicial re-
view of rules is far more frequent and searching than in the past.
Yet the formal administrative hearings which used to precede such re-
view have largely been abandoned. Preenforcement review by the
courts has preempted both adjudicatory proceedings at the agency
level and judicial review through trial de novo as the forum for
challenging the promulgation of rules. Courts and commentators un-
happy with this development have suggested reinstituting formal hear-
51. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 507 (8th Cir. 1975); Industrial Union
Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289,
301 & n.16 (5th Cir. 1974) (recognition that EPA's obligation to take action within a
statutory deadline might necessarily lead to reliance on imperfect data); Applications for
Suspension of 1977 Automobile Exhaust Emission Standards; Decision of the Adminis-
trator, 40 Fed. Reg. 11900 (1975).
52. See, e.g., Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental
Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 371 (1974); Note, suln'a note 46, at 1761-66.
53. Morgan v. United States, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.) (Morgan IV);
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938) (Morgan II).
54. 304 U.S. at 18.
55. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
56. KFC Nat'l Management Corp. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 1974).
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ings.57 Yet, as most of these same authorities recognize, this is a nos-
talgic and unrealistic hope.
This retrospective focus on the full machinery of adjudication does
not recognize that a formal proceeding is made up of many different
procedures, of which a trial-type hearing is only the most prominent.
The failure to make this distinction meant that as cross-examination
and the whole courtroom machinery of motions, pleadings, and pre-
siding officer were abandoned, the other procedures that historically
have gone along with them were dispensed with too. Most important
of these abandoned trappings was the requirement that a final agency
decision be explained in terms of a record to which all parties had
an opportunity to contribute. In consequence, as the following descrip-
tion of rulemaking at the Environmental Protection Agency will dem-
onstrate, the procedures used in informal rulemaking have become too
informal, impairing both the development of rules within the agency
and their subsequent review by the courts.
II. Informal Rulemaking at EPA
The Administrative Procedure Act is only a statute; it is not the
source of all agency procedures. Commentators who focus too nar-
rowly on the APA may forget what lies behind it, and the long paths
an agency rule may have to trace before even being proposed for
comment. Those who hope to improve agency rulemaking should
first understand how agencies work internally.
The following description of rulemaking at the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency5s provides some of that background. Though EPA is
57. Courts in OSHA cases have expressed dissatisfaction at having to apply a sub-
stantial evidence test in the absence of an adjudicatory hearing. See Synthetic Organic
Chent. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir. 1974); Industrial Union Dep't
v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 469, 473, 474, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Indeed, the need for such
a hearing has been suggested where courts review facts in detail under the arbitrary or
capricious test. See Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 321 (5th Cir. 1974) (concurring opinion).
To date, however, only one court has held that even the words "substantial evidence"
in a statute necessarily imply formal hearing procedures, and even it stopped short of
saying the full range of courtroom procedures was necessary. See Mobil Oil Corp. v.
FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1258-60, 1262-63 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Judge Bazelon has taken the dis-
satisfaction expressed in these cases one step further, arguing that courts are simply in-
capable of dealing with the kind of vastly complicated factual issues that now come
before them. From this he concludes that they should restrict themselves instead to
overseeing tie procedures by which agencies make decisions, and that formal hearing
procedures should be largely reinstituted to give them some procedures to oversee. See
Friends of the Earth v. AEC, 485 F.2d 1031, 1032-33 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (two-judge panel)
(separate statement of Bazelon, J.); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d
615, 650-53 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (concurring in result). But see Friends of the Earth v. AEC,
supra at 1035 (separate statement of Leventhal, J.).
58. The Environmental Protection Agency was created in 1970, not by legislation, but
by executive action subject to congressional veto. See note 3 supra. It consisted originally
of pollution control programs taken from various other federal agencies. Indeed, the
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only one of many rulemaking agencies, it has been extraordinarily
active in the past few years.59 Judicial opinions reviewing its regu-
lations often have pointed out problems and marked new directions
in the field of administrative law generally. Despite the following dis-
cussion, I believe EPA is one of the best regulatory agencies so far
as staff competence and morale, quality of top leadership, and political
courage are concerned. Though it certainly has extensive patches of
laziness and ineptitude, in many cases good staff work compensates
for the procedural deficiencies described below.
To a large extent, confusion and uncertainty are endemic to the
bureaucratic process, particularly in a new agency. With new statutes
to implement, with subject matter that is technically uncertain and
highly controversial, with so many people involved, so many com-
peting interests, and so many diverse views, there is no way to tie
up all the loose ends. Though this article does suggest specific re-
forms, they will at most alleviate the problems.60
A. Internal Procedures: Lead Offices, Working Groups,
Steering Committees and OMB
By internal agency and executive branch directives,"' EPA and the
purpose of its creation was to put all major federal pollution control programs under one
roof.
At present, EPA is a medium-sized bureaucracy with about 9,000 full-time employees
in five major divisions: air pollution, noise, and solid waste; water pollution and pesti-
cides programs; research and development; planning, program evaluation and agency
management; and enforcement. Several smaller activities, such as congressional rela-
tions, international affairs, and recently the General Counsel's office are independent
of these divisions and report to the Administrator directly. See Organization of the
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Order No. 1110.18D (June 5, 1975) (on file with
Yale Law Journal); Transfer of the Office of General Counsel to the Office of the Ad-
ministrator, EPA Order No. 1120.9 (Jan. 17, 1975) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
59. To pick one imperfect measure, the EPA has roughly doubled the volume of its
regulations annually. The first compilation of EPA regulations, which covered all regu-
lations issued before January 1, 1972, was 460 pages long. 40 C.F.R. (1972). The second
compilation, which added the 18 months from January, 1972, to the beginning of July,
1973, was 1012 pages long. 40 C.F.R. (1973). Since then the compilations have been up-
dated annually. The 1974 edition contained 1907 pages, 40 C.F.R. (1974), and the 1975
edition, now in press, will be much longer.
60. I do not mean to suggest that bureaucracy is a particularly incompetent form of
human endeavor. Though I have never worked there, I feel reasonably certain that simi-
lar observations could be made about decisionmaking in the Congress or the White
House, or in a university faculty or large corporation. I have worked in a large law
firm, and it was my experience that even these institutions have unquestioned attitudes
and practices, folkways and taboos, that often prevent them from reacting to problems in
the most rational or effective way.
61. Policy and Procedures for the Standards and Regulations Development Process,
EPA Order No. 1000.6 (Dec. 10, 1971) (on file with Yale Law Journal); Agency Regula-
tions, Standards and Guidelines Pertaining to Environmental Quality, Consumer Protec-
tion, and Occupational and Public Health and Safety, Memorandum to Heads of
Departments and Agencies from George P. Schultz, Director, Office of Management and
Budget (Oct. 5, 1971) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
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Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 2 command a far more
elaborate approach to rulemaking than anything that the Administra-
tive Procedure Act standing alone requires.63
Under internal EPA directives, the first formal step in drafting a
regulation is to assemble an ad hoc "working group" composed of
EPA staff members who have particular interest or competence in a
field. 4 Needless to say, not all members of the working group par-
ticipate actively; often most of the work is done by a few members.
The most active are usually those representing the "lead office" or
"office of primary interest"-the office which first had the idea for
the rule or has been assigned responsibility for it. This office typically
will far outdistance others in familiarity with the technical issues
involved. Indeed, the evidence of that familiarity, when written down
at all, may be very difficult for those outside the lead office to examine,
since it is often scattered through various studies, correspondence,
and contractors' reportsa in the possession of the lead office. More
data, of course, may be similarly scattered through other offices. There
is no formal mechanism to specify what the working groups should
62. The Office of Management and Budget was created out of the old Bureau of the
Budget by Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 7959, 84 Stat. 2085, which
became effective on July 1, 1970, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 906 (1970). It is part of the
Executive Office of the President. In addition to overseeing the development of each
agency's budget each year, it is supposed to improve government organization, informa-
tion, and management systems and to help the President run the executive branch as a
unified whole.
63. These rulemaking requirements only begin to apply, of course, once some element
of the agency has decided it would like to see a rule developed and promulgated. At
EPA at least, however, the decision to make that effort has literally been compelled in
most instances. The governing statutes require rules on a wide variety of subjects to be
promulgated within tight deadlines.
Environmental groups have been most successful in lawsuits designed to force com-
pliance where those deadlines have been missed. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (compelling promulgation of trans-
portation control plans under the Clean Air Act); Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. EPA, 6 BNA Environ. Rep. Cas. 1033 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub nora. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (compelling
publication of effluent guidelines under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act);
Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), af'd without opinion, 4 BNA
Environ. Rep. Cas. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd sub no n. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541
(1973) (equally divided Court) (compelling the insertion of nondeterioration provisions
in state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act).
64. Working groups are often put together informally from people who have worked
on similar problems in the past. If this is not done, the "office of primary interest" can
request the unit of EPA in charge of working groups to form one for it. This office
will then contact all portions of the agency that might have ail interest in the upcoming
regulation and ask them to assign memnbers. In either case, however, each regulation must
have an officially recognized working group assigned to it. If it does not, it is not sup-
posed to proceed to the later stages of the review process.
65. Private consulting firms often work on the development of regulations. When
this happens, some member of the office of primary interest will be in charge of super-
vising the contract.
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consider, or even to make sure that all members have a chance to con-
sider the same information.60 Disputes are raised and resolved in a
catch-as-catch-can way until all the apparent issues have been thrashed
out.
The working group then prepares a set of documents for review
within EPA. Typically these consist of (1) the draft regulation, com-
plete with explanatory preamble; (2) a technical support document
cited in the preamble which contains background information too
voluminous to be reprinted in the Federal Register;" 7 and (3) an
"action memorandum" addressed to the EPA Administrator to high-
light the major uncertainties, policy issues and probable objections
to the regulations. Where required, an environmental impact state-
ment"8 and an inflation impact statement 0 also will be included.
After these materials are assembled, the regulation is ready to move
on to the next stage.
This second stage consists of review by the "steering committee."
7
The steering committee is composed of permanent representatives from
each of the major sections71 of EPA plus a few permanent committee
staff members. Others may.also attend, -7 2 and in practice the steering
66. A recent EPA manual states that guidelines on "maintaining a central project
file" for each project handled at the working group level "will be issued shortly." EPA,
Office of Planning and Management, Procedures for the Standards and Regulations
Development Process, Dec. 6, 1974, at 6-7 (on file with Yale Law Journal). Such instruc-
tions, when they appear, should help alleviate the problem.
67. The technical support document is prepared by the office of primary interest and
is designed both to outline the state of the art in the relevant field and to put forward
the test data and technical reasoning that support the regulations.
68. This is required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) for
"every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(Supp. III 1973). Both the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857-571 (Supp. III 1973), and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (Supp. III 1973), contain
explicit legislative exemptions from the impact statement requirement of NEPA for
almost all actions taken under their authority. See 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (Supp. III
1973) (the FWPCA); Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 15
U.S.C.A. § 793(c)(1) (Supp. 1975) (creating the exemption for Clean Air Act actions).
However, EPA has agreed as a matter of policy to write NEPA statements on certain
categories of its exempt activities. See 39 Fed. Reg. 16186 (1974).
69. This is required by Exec. Order No. 11821, 3A C.F.R. 203 (1975), for "major
legislative proposals, regulations, and rules emanating from the executive branch which
may have a significant impact on inflation."
70. The "steering committee" falls under the jurisdiction of a subunit of EPA called
the Office of Planning and Evaluation, which is headed by a Deputy Assistant Adminis-
trator. Most federal agencies have an office of this type, with the function of analyzing
agency programs for economic and managerial rationality and consistency with other
agency programs. They are also supposed to act as devil's advocates to make sure all likely
objections have been considered in advance. How well they work is another matter.
71. See note 58 supra.
72. EPA has 19 Deputy Assistant Administrators who rank just below and (with one
exception) report to the heads of the five major divisions of the agency. These officials,
to oversimplify, serve as the link between the top of the agency, which is basically con-
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committee's weekly meetings generally have a minimum of 15 people
in attendance. Steering committee review of draft regulations is limited
to consideration of the documents assembled by the working group.
Passage through the steering committee is meant to ensure that no
significant part of EPA is denied the opportunity to comment from
its own perspective when new regulations are developed, and that all
new regulations become the subject of disinterested analysis by the
permanent staff of the steering committee.
After the steering committee has approved a proposed regulation,
but before it is sent to the Administrator for signature, copies of
the regulation and the various supporting documents are supplied to
the Office of Management and Budget and to other interested agen-
cies and departments for analysis and comment.7" Some of these re-
cipients release their copies to industries that would be affected by
the proposed regulation and thereafter serve as conduits for industry
views. Problems that arise during this review are bargained out be-
tween the agencies concerned, with OMB playing a role halfway be-
tween that of a judge and that of a moderator. EPA has occasionally
been able to get its way even on highly controversial points in this
forum. Only after the regulations have cleared OMB are they signed
by the Administrator and put out for the public comment contem-
plated by the APA. After comments have been received, the working
group analyzes them and, when necessary, revises the regulations, tech-
nical support document, or action memorandum. The revised regula-
tions are then reviewed once again by the steering committee and
OMB before promulgation in final form.
B. The Process As It Actually Works
Simply to outline the formal procedures established for developing
and reviewing rules inside the executive branch may give an exag-
gerated idea of their importance. They do indeed provide a structure
cerned with policy and with representing EPA to the world outside, and the lower levels
at which the more detailed technical work is done. Originally it was expected that they
would attend the steering committee meetings; in practice they generally stay away and
send one or more representatives. Members of working groups which have items on the
agenda often also attend.
73. See Davies 8: Lettow, The Impact of Federal Institutional Arrangements, in FEDFRAL
ENVIRONMENTAL L.-w 126, 136-37 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974). Only regulations
"pertaining to environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational and public
health and safety" are subject to this process. OMB Memorandum, supra note 61. This
review process causes far longer delays in rulemaking than anything the Administrative
Procedure Act standing alone requires. It is now called "Interagency Review." The
title was "Quality of Life Review" until some OMB staff member, conscious of the
Orwellian overtones, substituted the present name.
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through which most7 4 agency actions must pass, but other factors tend
to diminish their influence.
In most cases, the office of primary interest will care far more about
a given rule than any other group.75 The work done by the lead
office in developing and substantiating a rule may be so thorough
that further agency review is almost unnecessary. Whether or not this
is the case, however, the dominance of the lead office makes the role
of the working group far less significant than a description of the
system of review might suggest. As a senior EPA official with long
experience in government said in comments on an earlier draft of
this article:
76
[R]ulemaking follows the parochial outlook on the Agency's work
that is inevitable in so diverse an organization. A rule (an idea
for a rule) is generated by that sub-organization that needs the
rule to implement what it perceives to be its program. That sub-
organization does the basic staff work, writes issue and position
papers, and drafts a [Notice of Proposed Rulemaking] and brief-
ing memo. . . . WG's [working groups] get into the act rather
late in the process-and become active as a forum for sticky issues
only if it is not possible to give a nihil obstat imprimatur.
77
... Working Groups really do very little except carp, and protect
what they perceive to be their interests. Those of course are im-
portant functions, but they are not functions that generate the
data on the basis of which a rule is finally issued.
Working groups are supposed to be forums for resolving differences
of opinion within the agency before the agency position is fixed in
74. Some of the most important agency actions escape both internal EPA review and
OMB review. These have included the various suspensions of auto emission standards,
the decision to start proceedings to summarily prohibit the use of the pesticide aldrin/
dieldrin, and the promulgation of transportation control plans to reduce traffic in urban
areas. Here a combination of time pressure and the complexity of the subject matter
has swamped the usual intra-agency procedures. OMB review has been cut out both
for this reason and, in the first two cases, because the statute was very clear that
the Administrator of EPA was to make the decision and specified at least a fairly formal
procedure for him to use.
In such cases, the Administrator or his top aides have typically worked directly with
the staff members most directly concerned. On balance, I believe the decisions made in
this manner have been at least as good as those that have gotten the full steering com-
mittee/OMB treatment, though of course the Administrator can only become involved in a
handful of decisions.
75. Where large or controversial decisions are concerned, this is less likely to be
true, since members of other offices then have a real incentive to become familiar with
the problems.
76. Memorandum to William F. Pedersen, Jr. from a senior EPA official, May 4,
1975 (on file with Yale Law Journal) (emphasis in original; name withheld at the of-
ficial's request).
77. "Let nothing stand in the way of its printing."
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a proposed rule. But to the extent that serious disagreement actually
arises, working groups almost automatically cease to contribute to its
resolution:
If there is a very sticky issue, it is unlikely to be resolved at
the WG level. By the nature of the way EPA is (dis)organized,
really sticky issues are escalated at least to the [Deputy Assistant
Administrator] level and maybe higher for resolution. [Deputy As-
sistant Administrators] do not serve on WG's-there's no need
for their participation unless irreconcilable differences emerge,
and they don't find it useful to attempt to resolve such differences
on other than a collegial level. Thus WG's do not really function
as intended-they are a forum for formal coordination, but not
for creative analysis.
78
The steering committee typically makes even less of a contribution
to proposed rules than do the working groups. The same EPA official
observed:
[The steering committee] should . . . be a forum for surfacing
again reservations about the wisdom of a course of action proposed
by another OPI [office of primary interest], but it rarely turns
out to be that. The reason, I perceive, is that if the course deemed
unwise is not directly harmful to the interest of the office that
feels that way that office is reluctant to surface the issue for fear
of alienating the OPI-which presumably could throw up a similar
issue next time the concerned office had a proposed reg before
the SC [steering committee]. Thus objections are raised in SC only
when what are perceived as vital interests are at stake.
From my (admittedly infrequent) participation in SC (I have a
right to go and speak, but have no time for it and it has little
relevance to the real world as I see it) I have noted that little
intelligent discussion goes on except among people representing
organizations that have a direct interest-which should of course
have been settled at the WG level.
79
The political facts of life often act to preempt both the working
group and the steering committee. A main job of higher EPA officials,
above the steering committee level, is to remain in contact with out-
side groups such as industry, environmentalists, Congress and state
and local officials and, of course, with their own staffs. When a vital
issue arises, in the nature of things it will be swiftly brought to the
attention of these officials. A round of informal discussions is likely
to ensue, which often takes the main burden of resolving complex
or controversial issues.
78. Memorandum, supra note 76.
79. Id.
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Another set of problems arises because the controversial issues at
EPA also tend to be very technical and complex. This has always been
true to some extent for the administrative agencies; Congress makes
general policy and leaves the nuts and bolts to them. But the increas-
ing complexity of technical knowledge and the growing scope of gov-
ernment regulation have broadened the gap between policy and its
implementation and increased the importance of the latter. To take
one example, the question whether power plants should be required
to install scrubbers to remove sulfur compounds from their stack gasses
turns in the first instance on whether the scrubbers will work. But
if a given scrubber doesn't work, that may well stem from a lack
of proper maintenance, from the omission of some easy adjustment,
or from routine development problems that will quite predictably be
cleared up as the technology advances. The fact that a scrubber has
worked may be due to the nature of the particular fuel or facility,
so that no lesson has been learned about the efficacy of the technology
generally. When such uncertainties arise, as they do early in the dis-
cussion of any even moderately controversial issue, there is really no
way to answer them short of a thoroughgoing immersion in the data. '
Yet high government officials, at EPA and certainly still more at 0MB
(and, I am sure, in other agencies), do not want to be bothered with
the details of technical matters if they can possibly avoid it.s '
What is more, the briefing package to which the discussion of a
proposed rule is reduced at the steering committee stage is often un-
able to convey an adequate notion of the complex, uncertain and
ambiguous nature of the information and the choices involved. Even
when officials realize this and the matter is important, they are often
far too busy to master the data. The attitude of these officials toward
the regulation in question is thus significantly influenced by which
staff members are trusted, which present their case more plausibly,
who won last time, and other considerations extraneous to the tech-
nical complexities of the regulation itself.
80. This difficulty is reinforced by the intent of both the Clean Air Act and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act that EPA set standards not just on the basis of
what technology can presently achieve, but on the basis of what it could achieve.
with development, in future years. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1047-49
(8th Cir. 1975); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 628-29 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bonine,
The Evolution of Technology Forcing in the Clean Air Act, BNA EVIRON. REP. Mono-
graph No. 21 (1975); Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in FFDERL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 682, 705-06 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
81. One White House aide is quoted as having said that the scrubber issue "is not
the kind of thing we should take a position on because we just don't have the technical
expertise." Noone, Great Scrubber Debate Pits EPA Against Electric Utilities, 6 NATIONAL
JOURNAL REPoRTs 1103, 1110 (1974).
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The bureaucratic weight and inertia and the relatively coarse mesh
of the review process have two adverse (and seemingly contrary) effects
on those who develop regulations. First, stiff or problematical regula-
tions may simply not be pushed because too much bureaucratic coun-
terpressure will be generated. (The impulse for strict regulations must
be present at the working group level if there is to be any hope that
strict regulations will be issued-the upper levels of review by nature
tend to water down regulations in the light of other factors.) Second,
regulations that do get pushed may still be arbitrary to some degree,
particularly in the direction from which opposition is unlikely. The
upper levels of review cannot be thorough enough to catch the tech-
nical errors or errors of detail on which the legality and, indeed, the
wisdom of the regulations may depend.
C. The Need for Rigorous Judicial Review
In these circumstances, detailed factual review of regulations by
those with the power to change them takes place in two forums only
-at the level of the office of primary interest and working group
inside EPA, and in court. The working group generally will under-
stand the technical complexities of a regulation. So to a great extent
s -2
will members of the industry being regulated. But the review process
within the agency and the executive branch does not spur a working
group to make sure that the final regulation adequately reflects these
complexities. 83 To the extent that internal review is the only review
worried about, comments by the affected industry or (to pick a less
frequent case) by environmental groups may not be given the kind
of detailed consideration they deserve. Since the higher levels of re-
view are unwilling or unable to consider the more complex issues,
the best hope for detailed, effective review of complex regulations is
the judiciary.
Judge Leventhal's opinions in International Harvester Co. v. Ruck-
elshas s84 and Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus,85 and Judge
Bell's opinion in Texas v. EPA"0 represent a factual probing several
times more detailed than the regulations at issue had received since
they were first written.
The effect of such detailed factual review by the courts on the
82. The expert knowledge of different groups may of course fall in different areas.
For example, the industry will probably know the most about how soon given control
equipment can be put on line, while the EPA working group will probably know more
about the adverse health effects of a given pollutant.
83. See generally Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1314.
84. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
85. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
86. 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974).
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portion of the agency subject to it is entirely beneficial.ST It is a great
tonic to a program to discover that even if a regulation can be slipped
or wrestled through various layers of internal or external review with-
out significant change, the final and most prestigious reviewing forum
of all-a circuit court of appeals-will inquire into the minute details
of methodology, data sufficiency and test procedure and will send
the regulations back8s if these are lacking. The effect of such judicial
opinions within the agency reaches beyond those who were concerned
with the specific regulations reviewed. They serve as a precedent for
future rule-writers and give those who care about well-documented
and well-reasoned decisionmaking a lever with which to move those
who do not.
I see no way to relieve the courts, ultimately, of a substantial burden
of factual inquiry. Courts alone have the time,89 the influence, and the
freedom from ceremonial and "political" considerations that are neces-
sary to a thorough, dispassionate and effective review of extremely com-
plex and controversial matters. There is no reason, however, why the
courts should have to bear as much of the burden of factual analysis
as they have to date. In many instances the courts have done work
that the agency itself should have done.
III. A Procedural Approach to the Rulemaking Record
Despite the excellent job the courts have done in reviewing the
merits of EPA rules, it seems evident to those of us who observe
87. Certainly the decisions EPA made in response to these opinions on remand were
far superior to the decisions that prompted them. Both Professor Williams and Judge
Leventhal himself have suggested that EPA's decision after the remand in International
Harvester was something of a model for administrative agencies. See Williams, supra note
28, at 10 & n.32, 26, 43-44; Leventhal, supra note 49, at 554-55. The D.C. Circuit recently
sustained in all respects EPA's response to the remand order in Portland Cement. Port-
land Cement Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
88. What matters, in my opinion, is whether the agency's faults are detected, more
than what the court does after detecting them. Accordingly, in appropriate cases rigorous
judicial review need not automatically lead to a stay of the regulation after remand.
The court can leave the regulation in effect and so avoid damaging the agency's
achievement of its mission, while the response to the remand is being prepared. See
CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1050-51 (8th Cir. 1975); Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Leventhal, supra note 49, at 539.
89. In saying this, I am not arguing against the present consensus that the courts
of appeals are overworked. It is still true, however, that court of appeals judges spend
almost all their working day concerned with the intellectual merits of the controversies
before them, and that these controversies are presented in relatively organized form.
They are largely spared the endless round of political, organizational and simply cere-
monial duties to which their counterparts in the executive and legislative branches must
submit. My point ultimately is that if rulemaking records were formalized to reduce
inefficiency during review, court time spent in rigorously reviewing rulemaking would
be time well spent. If an increase in judicial resources thereby became necessary, the
costs involved would be well justified.
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them from the bottom that they aren't quite sure what they are look-
ing at or what they should do to it. By and large, the obligation to
undertake a fairly rigorous probing of the data and reasoning sup-
porting a regulation has been accepted. Yet the supporting structure
of trial-type hearings which used to precede such an inquiry has been
largely swept away.
The central loss in discarding the adjudicatory model in favor of
notice and comment rulemaking was not cross-examination 0 or oral
testimony in particular; rather it was the focused and defined record
which all the procedures used in adjudication were intended to pro-
duce. This record served as the basis for decision both at the agency
level and on review. There is at present in informal rulemaking no
parallel requirement that the record certified to the court be the
fruit of special procedures designed to produce it. As a result the
courts are confronted with huge unwieldy records, and are forced 90
to spend undue effort in weighting the parts of each record and ex-
tracting underlying reasons from the documents-jobs which the agen-
cies should have done themselves.
A. Two Views of the Rulemaking Record
The generally accepted standard of review of informal agency rule-
making-the "arbitrary or capricious" test-makes no reference to the
role of a record, and the courts and commentators have often said
that the agency can rely on its general expertise in promulgating rules
even when that expertise is not reflected in any record. 92
Yet there is a record. Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure states that when review of a regulation is sought in a court
of appeals, "[t]he agency shall file the record with the clerk of the
court ... within 40 days after service . . . of the petition for review
90. See note 33 supra.
91. The courts might attempt to require the attorneys to organize the record. This
has been done in some cases. See, e.g., Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 297 & n.8 (5th Cir.
1974). But this device tends to run very soon into the Burlington Truck barrier against
judging rules on the basis of the post hoc rationalizations of counsel. See Burlington
Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962); note 105 infra.
92. Angel v. Butz, 487 F.2d 260, 262-63 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 967
(1974); Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Administrator U.S. EPA, 480 F.2d 972,
976 (3d Cir. 1973); General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 862 (5th Cir. 1974);
California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43, 54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 844 (1967); Verkuil, supra note 28, at 187, 189; Note, supra note 25, at 784-85.
See also National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 41 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (accepting the statement, but finding allusions to expertise overwhelmed by other
evidence). See generally Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1242
(1966) ("Is not [agency] 'expertise' merely another term for knowledge of facts outside
the record plus built-in predispositions?')
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.... ."9 The only guidance on what the record must contain is given
in Rule 16 which states that "[t]he order sought to be reviewed or
enforced, the findings or report on which it is based, and the plead-
ings, evidence and proceedings before the agency shall constitute the
record on review in proceedings to review or enforce the order of
an agency." 94 The Advisory Committee's note adds that there "is no
distinction between the record compiled in the agency proceeding and
the record on review . . . . The record in agency cases is thus the
same as that in appeals from the district court-the original papers,
transcripts and exhibits in the proceeding below." 95 Plainly this lan-
guage was drawn up with adjudicatory proceedings in mind.',, It does"
not address how the record in an informal rulemaking case should
be assembled.
1. "Historical" Records and "Procedural" Records
In the review of agency actions less formal than full-scale adjudi-
cation, the guidelines followed in recent years have been those laid
down in the Overton Park case, where the Supreme Coure suggested
an approach to the compilation of the record diametrically opposed
to any thought that it reflect and follow the course of generally known
and binding procedures. The Overton Court said that judicial review
of the Secretary of Transportation's decision would have to be based
"on the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at
the time he made his decision. ' 9 7 Since the Court recognized a few
pages earlier that there was no formal agency proceeding in decisions
of this type for generating a record, the Court must have meant that
the documents actually presented to the Secretary for his considera-
tion would constitute the record. But this is based on the false as-
sumption that all documents critical in reaching a given agency de-
cision are in fact placed "before" the head of the agency, and that
the internal procedures of the agency are firmly enough established
and well enough observed to make location of these documents a rather
93. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 17, 389 U.S. 1087 (1968).
94. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 16(a), 389 U.S. 1087 (1968). This closely
follows the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2112(b) (1970), which provides for the record on
review of agency orders.
95. Advisory Committee Note, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 16 (1969). The judicial review pro-
visions of the Administrative Procedure Act provide that in applying any of the
specified legal tests to any form of agency action "the court shall review the whole
record or those parts of it cited by a party." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. III 1973).
96. The use of the term "order" in Rule 16 supports this conclusion, although the
technicalities of the definitions used in the APA do not settle questions of appellate
procedure.
97. 401 U.S. at 420.
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ministerial act.9s Since these assumptions are not true, the only way
to assemble a record that gives the court a picture of what the agency
actually thought and considered is through an ad hoc effort to re-
construct what happened in a particular case. To do this, the docu-
ments that have passed through the formal internal procedures of the
agency must be examined. But since these formal procedures are
scarcely the exclusive vehicles for considering issues within an agency,
much else must be included as well. I call this effort at post hoc re-
construction of what actually happened a "historical" approach to
compiling a record. °0
Courts and commentators have often endorsed a historical ap-
proach. 100 It does not correspond, however, to the way records for de-
cision and judicial review are generated in trial courts and agency
adjudication. As the committee note to Rule 16 suggests, a record
98. "The Court in Overton Park seemed to assume that there was somewhere an
elaborate administrative record which could easily be produced." Nathanson, supra note
31, at 723.
99. However, since little effort is typically spent on assigning weights to the docu-
ments or attempting to place them in the context of a narrative, "archive" might be
more descriptive of what is generally produced.
100. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d
722, 729 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 297 (5th Cir. 1974); Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 491 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1974);
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 507 (4th Cir. 1973); Scalia &- Goodman,
Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 899, 933-36
(1973); Verkuil, supra note 28, at 204 ("One can conclude that 'record' now means what-
ever the agency produces on review.") See also id. at 228, 246; Note, supra note 25, at
802 n.126.
Of course the device of review on a historical record has not been confined to rule-
making. Courts reviewing less formal agency action have also often called for the "full
administrative record" to be produced. This was true in Overton Park itself, and also
in the other leading Supreme Court case on that point, Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138
(1973) (refusal to grant national bank charter). See Rhode Island Consumers' Council
v. FPC, 504 F.2d 203, 209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Leventhal, J.) (FPC approval of non-
unanimous settlement of agency adjudicatory proceeding); Bradley v. Weinberger, 483
F.2d 410, 414-15 (1st Cir. 1973) (FDA labeling order); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282,
1283-84 (Ist Cir. 1973) (NEPA statement); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1103
(2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974) (federal'approval of ex-
perimental state work requirements for recipients of welfare federally funded in part).
In Aguayo Judge Friendly said:
"[C]onsideration of these claims . . . takes us into a type of judicial review con-
siderably more difficult to define and exercise than traditional review of administra-
tive action. We have here no adversary hearing, no record, no statement of the
grounds for the Secretary's action, except as these may be inferred from the papers
on which he acted and from the largely unhelpful documents prepared specifically
for this litigation.
473 F.2d at 1103.
The criticisms made in this article of the "historical" record, and the suggestion that
administrative records be defined in procedural terms, would seem to be applicable to
such informal actions as well. For a case where a court reviewing informal action re-
quired certain steps to be taken to generate and organize a "record," see Oljato Chapter
of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 665-67 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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is normally defined as the material which has been accepted under
a given obligatory set of procedures. I call this a "procedural" ap-
proach to compiling the record. A trial court record is "procedural"
since it consists of everything that has been properly placed in evidence
under defined rules of admissibility during the course of the trial.
2. The Recommendations of the Administrative Conference
Unfortunately, the most authoritative recent statement on what rule-
making records should contain completely fails to grasp the distinction
between a "procedural" and a "historical" approach. In consequence,
if followed it would not only perpetuate the present use of historical
records; in some respects it would make them worse. The Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States' 01 has recommended 0 2 that
the record for judicial review of informal rulemaking should consist
of (1) the notice of proposed rulemaking and any documents referred
to in it; (2) the comments and documents submitted by interested
persons; (3) transcripts of any hearings held in the course of the rule-
making; (4) reports of any advisory committees; (5) the agency's con-
cise general statement or final order and any documents referred to
in it; and (6) other factual information "not included in the foregoing
that was considered by the authority responsible for promulgation of
the rule or that is proffered by the agency as pertinent to the rule."'
' 3
The first five items cause no difficulty. Both under a historical ap-
proach to the record and under a procedural approach, they would
certainly be included. But the first clause of the sixth recommendation
comes down squarely on the side of the historical approach by ex-
plicitly recognizing the agency's right to include in the record what-
ever documents it "considered"-even if they arose outside the APA
notice and comment procedures. 104 In addition, in defining the record
as what was considered by the "authority responsible for promulgation
of the rule," the Administrative Conference misstates the nature of
101. The Administrative Conference of the United States is a large body of temporari-
ly appointed experts on administrative law, assisted by a small permanent staff of civil
servants, which is supposed to study the full range of agency procedures and make
recommendations for legislative changes. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-76 (Supp. II 1973).
102. Recommendation No. 74-4, Preenforcement judicial review of rules of general
applicability, 1 C.F.R. § 305.74-4 (1975) (adopted May 30-31, 1974).
103. 1 C.F.R. § 305.74-4(1)(4) (1975).
104. Indeed the recommendation could be read as refusing to adopt the rule laid
down in Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), that highly
relevant factual materials be disclosed to interested parties for comment before the
agency may rely on them. See p. 75 infra. The first five categories all refer to in-
formation which will have been disclosed to the public. The last category can easily be
read as a "residual" one covering information that was not submitted to this process.
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rulemaking. Only a very few, highly controversial issues can hope to
receive detailed personal attention from the administrator of a busy
agency, be he or she ever so competent. In all other cases, no single
authority passes judgment on the rule. Different parts of the agency
work on different parts of the rule, or on the same part from different
angles-and the rule emerges. It follows from the lack of any meaning-
ful central "authority" that the phrase "considered by the authority"
also loses meaning, and sets no clear boundary to the size or content
of the record. Given the diffuse nature of rulemaking, it will be a rare
document that cannot claim to have been considered somewhere to
some extent by someone in connection with the rulemaking, and a
document almost as rare that will have received the personal attention
of the administrator.
The other test suggested by the Administrative Conference for in-
cluding documents in the record-whether they are "proffered by
the agency as pertinent to the rule"-is even worse. It breaks free of
the restriction implicit even in the historical approach that the record
certified to the court should reflect what the agency actually weighed
and evaluated in some manner at the time of the rulemaking. Indeed,,
it would apparently allow the agency to include whatever it thinks
would help support its actions once litigation has begun. 1°5
The relevant questions, which the Administrative Conference recom-
mendation ignores, thus are the quality of the consideration given the
documents involved and the manner in which they are determined
to be relevant. Instead, the recommendation- follows Overton Park in
assuming falsely that all of the internal decisionmaking procedures of
the agencies are (1) satisfactory and (2) given.
105. The cases have long since established that an agency action may not be upheld
for reasons put forward for the first time by counsel during judicial review, rather than
by the agency itself. Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962);
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1973). This has
come to be known as the Burlington Truck rule.
Yet at the same time it is relatively easy for the agency to supplement the record
unilaterally after rulemaking is over and judicial review has begun. Under the historical
approach to compiling a record it is hard to show that any documents so offered do not
qualify for inclusion, at least if they predate the final regulation. See Amoco Oil Co. v.
EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 729 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Indeed, if some form of public comment
is invited before the record is supplemented, supplementing the record is affirmatively
encouraged by both International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 633 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) and Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Despite this, I believe that agency action to supplement the record in whatever manner
(short of a full reproposal) after the main rulemaking has closed carries with it several
of the same dangers that led to the Burlington Truck rule. These actions frequently
reflect the views of agency counsel at a time when their influence has been magni-
fied by the onset of litigation, and do not mean that those who actually originated
the rule are being forced by litigation to have second thoughts about what they did.
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3. Procedural Records in the Courts
A few courts have made an effort to solve some of these problems
by defining the record for judicial review of informal rulemaking in
procedural terms. In Automotive Parts and Accessories Corp. v.
Boyd, 10 6 a case involving the promulgation of auto safety standards,
the D.C. Circuit stated that the record for judicial review "consist[ed]
of the submissions made in response to the invitations issued for writ-
ten comments." Since the record plainly also must include the pro-
posed rule to which the submissions were directed, and the final rule
which is the subject of the petition, the thrust of Automotive Parts
is to define the record in terms of the three stages of rulemaking
required by § 553 of the APA-proposal of the rule, receipt of pub-
lic comments and final promulgation, together with a response to
comments.
Yet despite Automotive Parts, no court has actually adopted a pro-
cedural approach to the extent of excltding material that has not been
included in the three steps of § 553 notice and comment procedures.
This drives both the agency and the plaintiff challenging the rule
(typically the industry being regulated) to try to get as many docu-
ments into the record as possible. In that process, any real attempt
at "historical" reconstruction is soon lost or blurred.
B. EPA Practice in Compiling Rulemaking Records
When a petition for review of an EPA regulation is filed, the first
job of the EPA lawyer assigned to the case is to compile the record
or oversee its compilation. One knows from the start that certain
documents must go in even under a strict procedural approach. These
include the notice of proposed rulemaking and any technical support
document cited in it, the public comments, the transcript of any
hearings that may have been held and, of course, the final rule itself.
In virtually every case, however, the agency has numerous other docu-
ments relevant to the rulemaking in one way or another. The pressure
to put these documents in the record as well is irresistible, once they
106. 407 F.2d 330, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also Rodway v. United States Dep't of
Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("The whole record in an informal rule-
making case is comprised of comments received, hearings held, if any, and the basis and
purpose statement."); Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 171 (6th Cir. 1973)
("The Administrator built no record in approving or disapproving the state plans. He
took no comments, data, or other evidence from interested parties, [pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 553], nor did he articulate the basis for his actions."); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC,
475 F.2d 842, 850 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974).
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come to the attention of the supervising attorney. 10 7 If they favor the
agency, they certainly can't hurt and might as well go in. If they
are damaging, they also must go in once the lawyer handling the case
has discovered them, both out of simple honesty and because nothing
could prejudice the agency's position more irreparably in the eyes of
the courts than to be caught suppressing information. The agency's
presumption must be that any suppression will be discovered. Agen-
cies leak, and in addition many petitioners have begun to make broad
requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)a0 8 for all docu-
ments relevant to a particular rulemaking.
The newly relaxed burden of proof requirements and the "bad faith"
exemption to the Morgan test also contribute to the pressure for long
records. If agency action is increasingly based on policy judgments
about competing risks rather than on conclusive facts, it is hard to see
how the agency can refuse to give in some detail a history of how that
judgment was formed as one means of checking its validity. As for
"bad faith," EPA's experience has been that its presence is far more
often suggested by industry counsel than believed in, and far more
often believed in than actually present. In most cases, then, simple
disclosure of the relevant documents by the agency will be a conclusive
response. And, against that background, any failure to make such dis-
closure automatically tends to raise some question about motives.
The agency lawyer may find most relevant documents or copies of
them in one spot within the office of primary interest. But very often,
this does not happen. 10 9 Program offices themselves are often diffuse.
In addition, complex regulations stop in several places as they are de-
veloped. In a geographically spread-out agency like EPA,110 these are
107. However, as a general rule documents generated during the OMB review process
are not included in the record. This would include not only comments to EPA from
other agencies, but also the often extensive comments sent by regulated parties and
others to OMB directly.
108. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. III 1973).
109. The pattern in which these documents turn up provides a highly sensitive guide
to the coherence of the rulemaking. If most relevent documents or copies of them are
found in one spot, and that is one particular location within the program office or
offices mainly responsible for the rule, there is at least some assurance that agency
consideration of the problems has been centered there and that it was at least potentially
possible for reviewing offices inside the agency to look at the background of the rule-
making as a whole.
110. EPA's headquarters and top officials are located in Washington, D.C. Some
headquarters supporting staff is still across the Potomac in the Virginia suburbs. Ten
regional offices-in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Dallas, Kansas City,
Chicago, Denver, San Francisco, and Seattle-are responsible for implementing and in
large measure for developing EPA programs in their respective areas of the country.
They often take a lively interest in the development of regulations. Finally, large
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often in different parts of the country. Often each office that reviews
the rule speaks on the basis of its own separate documentation. Yet
this documentation, though it formed that office's thinking, may not
be forwarded in its entirety to the lead office along with the recom-
mendations that were based on it. Such documents, when discovered
in compiling the record, must also be made a part of it. Despite these
difficulties, the obligation to act in good faith at least tells the agency
lawyer where to stop. If all the program offices have been checked
for relevant documents, good faith at least is satisfied.11
Industry lawyers will look more exclusively to the results which
they can obtain by making additions to the record. Thanks to recent
decisions which limit the extent to which an agency can support its
actions by including in the record material the other side has not
seen before," 2 their main fear probably is not that an agency will
put forward new material to support its own case. Rather they will
worry that material which supports their own position or makes the
agency look bad will be withheld. Accordingly, industries affected by
EPA rulemaking frequently invoke the Freedom of Information Act
as a discovery device."
13
scientific and engineering staffs, whose work is often vital to a rule, are located in
Durham, North Carolina; Cincinnati, Ohio; Ann Arbor, Michigan; Duluth, Minnesota;
Las Vegas, Nevada; and Corvallis, Oregon.
111. Unfortunately, the immense job of searching the files of all relevant offices to
assemble a record must generally be done in a hurry, and much of it is necessarily
delegated to persons remote from the litigation and even from the rulemaking. All too
often, then, this effort does not disclose all the relevant documents.
When relevant papers adverse to the agency turn up after the initial record has been
filed, there is really no alternative to filing them as a supplemental record. If they are
favorable, the agency will face the unpalatable choice of either leaving the court in
ignorance of their existence or filing a supplemental record that will inevitably look
like a last-minute effort to reinforce a shaky case. Such embarrassments to lawyers apart,
however, these events raise some question about the completeness of the "historical"
archive that typically gets filed in rulemaking cases.
112. See pp. 75-76 infra.
113. One such request was submitted on behalf of the Utility Water Act Group, an
association of electric power companies, in connection with EPA's development of
effluent guidelines for steam electric power plants under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act. After describing the information in general terms, the letter goes on to
state:
We request all material (1) without regard to whether it is fact, opinion or
recommendation, (2) whatever its form, whether report, study, survey, anal)sis,
memorandum, letter, working papers, or other, (3) irrespective of its type, whether
scientific, economic, technical or the like, (4) without regard to its source, whether
from an employee of EPA or any other governmental entity, from the consultants
of any governmental entity, from groups established to advise governmental bodies,
such as EPA's Effluent Standards and Water Quality Information Advisory Con-
mittee, or from any element of the public, not least of all industry and eiiiron-
mentalists, and (6) [sic] whatever the level at which the material is sent fiora or
received by EPA.
We request all material relating to regulations for steam electric power plants
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For a variety of reasons, this tactic has worked fairly well for those
who use it, even though the statute probably wasn't intended for that
purpose.11 4 One is the same need of the agency to appear candid
that makes its own contribution to the record grow. Another is that
many documents that probably could be withheld simply aren't worth
fighting about, particularly given the amount of work such a fight can
entail. Disclosure of such documents harmless to the agency's position
leads naturally to the inference that documents which the agency might
withhold are the reverse, and so pressure increases for disclosure of
all documents to reduce suspicion. Finally, the agency usually will be
reluctant to start a procedural fight that might delay a decision on
the merits, 115 because of its general interest in speedy review. A victory
or partial victory in court allows programs to move ahead with much
more authority; defeats ideally should be suffered early in a program's
life, so that not much time is lost.
But even if documents are disclosed to the industry, it does not au-
tomatically follow that they will be included in the record. If they
are made available in time for the industry to resubmit them as part
of the comments on the proposed rule, then they will become part of
the record by definition. But if the industry waits until the rule is
formally proposed to file an FOIA request, this may not be possible;
the time limit for disclosure under the 1974 amendments to the Free-
dom of Information Act" 6 is only slightly shorter than the typical com-
ment period on a rule."17 Indeed, industries often do not think to file
under the pertinent FWPCA provisions, even material which EPA regards as back-
ground data, working papers and drafts, or as having no merit.
Letter from George C. Freeman, Jr., Counsel for the Utility Water Act Group, to Ann
Dore, Director, Office of Public Affairs, EPA, May 29, 1974, at 6-7 (on file with Yale
Lanw Journal). The EPA staff lawyer who handled this request estimates that some
100,000 pages of documents were disclosed under it.
114. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 S. Ct. 1504, 1513 n.10 (1975) ("The Act is
fundamentally designed to inform the public about agency action and not to benefit
private litigants."); Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974)
("Discovery for litigation purposes is not an expressly indicated purpose of the Act.")
See also Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 824 (1970) (appears to accept view that an agency under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act may withhold documents cited as support for a rule); Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 705-08 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
115. This motive has its effect even though the courts have been, unwilling to enjoin
agency action pending the outcome of litigation on a related Freedom of Information
Act request. See Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974);
National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 185 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
116. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561.
117. Under the 1974 amendments, an agency has an outside limit of 50 working days
to act on a request for information. See Act of Nov. 21, 1974, § (c), Pub. L. No. 93-502,
88 Stat. 1561. Further delay would be possible if the agency forced the party invoking
the FOIA to litigate. Proposed rules typically have a comment period of 60 or 90
calendar days.
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an FOIA request until the beginning of litigation. Cases often arise,
then, where the agency has no clear legal obligation to include in
the record documents that the industry would like to see there.118 If
the agency firmly refused to include them, the industry might be will-
ing to litigate the question. In practice, however, such disputes seldom
become major or last long. The same pressures that make for long ini-
tial records, and for full compliance with FOIA requests, make it seem
pointless to fight when the inclusion of additional documents in the
record is suggested. At every stage, then, the tendency of the record
is to increase in length and become less organized. Factual materials,
documents describing the development of policy, and documents in-
cluded simply to quiet suspicions of bad faith will all be jumbled
in together.
C. Problems of the Current Approach to Compiling the Record
The unwieldy and disorganized records created through this process
must be a plague to the courts. Several courts have commented ad-
versely on the sheer burden of extra work created." 9 This work con-
sists of more than just assimilating and cross-referencing a large body
of material. The chaos in records certified to reviewing courts has
affected the process of judicial review itself,120 in a way that increases
the burdens placed on the courts and decreases the useful discipline
imposed on the agency.
118. The documents may be viewed by the agency, for example, as raising matters
which have been definitely settled already, or which were not addressed during the
rulemaking, or which can only be litigated in another forum. The petitioners in Texas
v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 294 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974), for example, attempted to have included
in the record numerous documents relating to the proper techniques for measurement
of ambient levels of photochemical oxidants, even though the air quality standard itself
prescribes a measuring technique. EPA refused on the ground that the measuring
technique is an integral part of the air quality standard which in turn, under § 307 of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (Supp. III 1973), can only be reviewed in the
D.C. Circuit.
119. Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("In sub-
stantial remaining part, however, [the record] consists of a melange of written state-
ments, letters, reports, and similar materials . . . untested by anything approaching the
adversary process."); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 308 n.31 (5th Cir. 1974); id. at 321-22
(Clark, J., concurring). See also Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of La-
bor, 489 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1974) ("The state of the record in this case is one of the
difficulties besetting our review function."); Florida Peach Growers, however, involved
an OSHA temporary emergency standard promulgated without proposal or a comment
period. In addition, EPA attorneys in at least two cases I am familiar with have been
asked by circuit judges during litigation to explain what the court should do with the
record.
120. "The type of administrative proceeding and the form of record it produces will
influence the method of review." Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of
Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1974). See Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 743-44 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
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1. The Impact on the Courts
Whatever the standard of review, it has been accepted since the
first case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.121
that the validity of an agency decision depends not only on whether
there exist legally adequate reasons for the decision but on whether
the reasons offered by the agency are among them. A closely related
principle is that where no reason at all has been given, the agency ac-
tion must not be sustained. In Judge Leventhal's words, the agency's
decision "must be explained, not merely explainable."' 122
But explained where? This question takes on particular point when
a court is faced with a record containing a great many documents pre-
pared within or for the agency whose action is under review, but which
have been considered and endorsed to widely varying degrees by dif-
ferent groups in the agency.' 2 3 At present, a fairly rigorous approach
prevails, under which the necessary articulation of reasons must appear
in the preamble to the promulgated rule or in some other document
of equally formal standing.124 But many courts are still content to plow
through the certified papers to make their own judgment as to whether
what happened was rational; agency actions have been upheld where
the justification appeared in factual studies, contractors' reports, or
documents prepared by subordinate agency personnel and not approved
by or even presented to their superiors.12 5
To some extent, as Judge Friendly has noted,12 6 this tendency is
probably inevitable. The impulse for a court to uphold as much of
a rule as seems justified from an independent examination of the
record can be very strong, particularly in important, attractive or
clear cases. Such a course may well seem more responsible and more
in accord with the governing congressional purpose than upsetting a
whole program because some of the more or less apparent reasons be-
121. 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (Chencry I).
122. Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 539 (1972) (Leventhal, J.).
123. For a case with a record reflecting this tendency, see the panel opinion (since
vacated) in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 7 BNA ENVIRON. REP. CAS. 1353 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 28, 1975),
vacated on order granting rehearing en banc, No. 73-2205 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 17, 1975),
reheard en bane (D.C. Cir., May 30, 1975).
124. Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d
342, 353 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.); Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States Dep't of
Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 105-07 (3d Cir. 1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d
846, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal, J.). But see Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States
Dep't of Labor, supra at 109-10 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
125. See Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974); Delaware Citizens for Clean Air,
Inc. v. Administrator U.S. EPA, 480 F.2d 972, 977 (3d Cir. 1973); Bunny Bear, Inc. v.
Peterson, 473 F.2d 1002 (1st Cir. 1973). See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
126. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administra-
tive Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199.
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hind it were not formally provided. Indeed, this temptation may have
its effect even where the court does not openly yield to it. A judge-may
find that a required standard of factual support has been met and
reasons sufficiently articulated even in cases where that might not be
apparent to an outside observer.
But this tendency is reinforced by the open ended and disorganized
way in which rulemaking records are compiled at present. Once docu-
ments find their way into the record, the parties will cite and discuss
them, creating pressure on the court to consider them even where they
were not discussed by the agency or the parties during the rule-
making.
1 2 7
Such ad hoc review has another consequence. It tends to erode the
Morgan bar against probing the actual mental processes of the de-
cisionmaker. 128 That rule was announced in the course of reviewing
an agency decision taken after a formal hearing. Indeed, to a great
extent it only makes sense when a decision has been shaped and struc-
tured by formal procedures. Where such procedures are comprehen-
sive and binding enough to give substantial protection against ar-
bitrary or unreasoned action, judicial review can be limited to what
has passed through them and still be effective. But if the procedures
are not satisfactory, pressure to reach beyond them to the actual "men-
tal process" of the agency will result.
Some probing of mental processes is implicit in a historical record,
which by its nature is supposed to reflect the internal workings of
the agency in a way that a trial record does not reflect the internal
workings of a court. The various agency documents, with dates, au-
thors and addresses, do in fact provide a fair amount of material for
such an examination. Yet any suggestion that the Morgan rule may
be inapplicable in judicial review of informal action has been rejected
by the courts.' 29 The result has been to saddle the courts with a
"mental processes" rule which is only acceptable if decisionmaking
procedures are satisfactory. At present there are no such procedures,
and the records submitted by their nature invite the kind of review
127. See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 666 (1st Cir. 1974), where the
court, in remanding portions of the Boston transportation control plan to EPA for
further technical analysis, said:
It is perhaps paradoxical that the necessity of a further hearing arises from the
fault not of EPA but of petitioners, who . . . were remiss in not presenting the
questions now troubling us at the original [informal administrative] hearing. ...
Were the proceeding of less importance to the public at large we might decline to
entertain the objections at this late stage.
128. See note 53 supra.
129. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 491 F.2d 1141, 1144-45 (2d Cir.)
(Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974).
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that Morgan rejected. It follows that greater formality in rulemaking
is necessary to make the Morgan test appropriate.
2. The Impact on Agency Rulemaking
Section 553 of the APA requires that an agency incorporate in the
rules which it adopts "a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose." 130 This requirement is met by "preambles" to proposed and
final rules which often incorporate by reference technical support
documents. As discussed below, the degree of detail required in these
documents has become much greater than the language of the APA
might initially suggest. 131 Simply adding detail, however, without pro-
cedural reforms, will not lead to satisfactory results under a system
of ad hoc judicial review.
A requirement that an agency be judged on a single, comprehensive,
detailed justification for its decision, prepared at the time when it
promulgates a rule, would have several potentially beneficial effects.
It would force the various subunits within the agency to pursue their
differences on questions of fact, interpretation or policy until they
could be resolved. It would force the agency to choose between al-
ternative data, theories and methodologies and create a coherent case
upon which scrutiny by the courts can be focused. Unfortunately, these
benefits cannot be completely realized under the present system of
historical records and ad hoc judicial review. Under such a system,
the statements drafted and published as justifications for rules are not
completely binding on the agency. The stated justifications for a rule
will be less comprehensive and thoughtful if there is the possibility
that they could be supplemented with other material on review. The
commitment of the agency to a given argument or to the relative as-
signments of importance given to various documents obviously means
less if the agency lawyer can persuade a court to accept a justification
built on anything which the "agency". "considered."
Thus, carelessness by the subunits of the agency in drafting the
preamble and technical support documents is not necessarily perceived
as fatal to the success of the rule on review. As a result the offices
within an agency which are most familiar with the basis for the rule
and which are most capable of stating the strongest case for its adop-
tion do not have the maximum incentive to expend significant effort
in doing so. As long as there is ad hoc review of historical records,
agency lawyers will continue to discover during judicial review that
130. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (Supp. III 1973).
131. See p. 75 infra.
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important material has been underemphasized or overlooked in the
supporting documents drafted by these groups. There is no assurance
that strong supporting arguments which were developed by one office
will find their way into the stated support for the rule. Opposing
data and argument which could have been answered may not be
answered thoroughly. And most importantly, this lack of discipline
may cause an agency to promulgate a rule which with a few changes
would be better able to withstand industry attacks and judicial re-
view. Accordingly what is needed is not just more detail in rulemak-
ing, but a set of procedures for presenting and organizing that detail
in a principled way before a rule is promulgated.
IV. Making the Rulemaking Record Binding
EPA rulemaking does not suffer from a lack of formal mechanisms
for criticism of an initial proposal. These already include the work-
ing groups, steering committee, OMB, public comment and informal
meetings. But because the information used in rulemaking and the
conclusions reached are never formally entered into a binding record,
this criticism does not probe deeply enough in all cases. 132 Such bind-
ing procedures for compilation of a record during rulemaking would
encourage the analysis of problems in greater depth even before regu-
lations are challenged by interested parties in the courts. This section
examines how the courts have begun working out such procedures and
how they should finish the job.
A. Portland Cement
Taken on its face, the notice and comment process outlined in § 553
of the APA is undemanding. As the number and importance of the
subjects addressed by rulemaking have increased, Congress in the par-
ticular regulatory statutes increasingly has called for use of additional
procedures.133 But even more important, the courts have begun to
read new procedural requirements into the text of § 553 itself. These
new requirements, together with substantive judicial review, are be-
132. For this reason, I see little hope of better rulemaking from EPA's decision to
write NEPA environmental impact statements for its major regulatory activities. 39 Fed.
Reg. 16186 (1974). The NEPA analysis-which calls into play a statute whose purpose
is to provide wider perspective-is a mechanism for increasing the breadth of anal)sis,
not for ensuring that the analysis probes deeply enough.
133. These can include requirements for consultations with other federal agencies
or with advisory committees, informal legislative-type hearings, requirements that even
rules promulgated by notice and comment procedures be reviewed under a substantial
evidence test, and retention of a veto power over each rule by Congress. See Hamilton,
supra note 9, at 1313-30.
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coming the most effective and reliable safeguards against arbitrary
regulation in the whole rulemaking process. 13
The foundations here have been laid down in a series of opinions
by Judge Leventhal. The cornerstone is Portland Cement Association
v. Ruckelshaus,135 though Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 30 and In-
ternational Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus1 37 are also important. These
cases impose the following procedural standards for rulemaking.
First, both the essential factual data on which the rule is based
and the methodology used in reasoning from the data to the proposed
standard must be disclosed for comment at the time a rule is proposed.
To the extent they are not available at that time, they must be dis-
closed when they become available. 38 Second, the agency's discussion
of the basis and purpose of its rule-generally contained in the "pre-
ambles" to the notices of proposed and final rulemaking and in the
accompanying technical support documents-must detail the steps of
the agency's reasoning and its factual basis.'39 Third, significant com-
134. Although the opinions imposing these new procedural requirements should have
a persuasive impact on other courts, as yet these reforms are the law only in the D.C.
Circuit. By no means are these reforms an accomplished fact for all federal administra-
tive agencies. Exclusive venue in the D.C. Circuit is relatively rare even at EPA. The
Federal Water Pollution Control Act nowhere provides for it. And though the Clean
Air Act does call for it in a number of major cases, see 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (Supp. III
1973), review of state implementation plans-by far the largest category of cases-generally
takes place in the federal circuit which includes the state involved. Only when a "national"
issue affecting the whole country is involved may the case be transferred to the D.C.
Circuit. See Dayton Power & Light Co. v. EPA, No. 74-2297 (6th Cir., June 16, 1975).
135. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
136. 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
137. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
138. It is not consonant with the purpose of a rule-making proceeding to promul-
gate rules on the basis of . . . data that, [in] critical degree, is known only to the
agency.
In order that the rule-making proceedings to determine standards be conducted
in orderly fashion, information should generally be disclosed as to the basis of a
proposed rule at the time of issuance. If this is not feasible . . . information that
is material to the subject at hand should be disclosed as it becomes available, and
comments received, even though subsequent to issuance of the rule--with court
authorization, where necessary.
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Similarly,
in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631-32 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the
court, though declining to hold that EPA's failure to allow auto companies to comment
on the technical assumptions or methodology used in the agency's prediction that auto
emission standards could be met was a violation of any specific provision of law, did
note that this failure presented "[a] . . . serious problem, at least from the point of view
of an informed decision-making process." The court required that "the parties should
have opportunity on remand to address themselves to matters not previously put before
them by EPA for comment, including [the methodology used in making the original
decision.]" Id. at 649.
139. [S]ection 111 of the Clean Air Act, properly construed, requires the functional
equivalent of a NEPA impact statement. ...
... To the extent that EPA is aware of significant adverse environmental conse-
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ments received during the public comment period must be answered
at the time of final promulgation. However, comments must meet a
standard of detail equal to that required of the agency in promulgat-
ing its rule before they will be considered significant. 140 Fourth, only
objections to the regulations which were raised with some specificity
during the public comment period, and to which the agency thus had
an opportunity to respond, may be raised during judicial review. 141
Although these procedures may be new to agency rulemaking, the
ideas behind them are not new at all. In each case, the "new" pro-
cedure simply transposes to rulemaking principles well established
and accepted where agency adjudication is concerned. Both cases and
statutes have long demanded, of course, that an opinion in agency
adjudication articulate the reasons for the action and respond to sig-
nificant objections, however much that requirement may have been
honored in the breach. 42 That all material information must be dis-
quences of its proposal, good faith requires appropriate reference in its reasons for
the proposal and its underlying balancing analysis.
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 384-86 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
[A] comment on the proper use of scientific literature may be in order. If such
literature is relied upon, the agency should indicate which particular findings of
that literature are significant. A generalized reference, to a work as a whole, will
avail the agency little if a problem arises on judicial review.
Id. at 400. In an earlier case, Judge Leventhal noted:
Inherent in the responsibility entrusted to this court [to review EPA standards] is a
requirement that we be given sufficient indication of the basis on which the Ad-
ministrator reached [his judgment] so that we may consider whether it embodies
an abuse of discretion or error of law.
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted).
Although the court also said that "[w]e are not to be taken as specifying that the agency
must provide the same articulation as is required for orders or regulations issued after
evidentiary hearings," id., this qualification, at EPA at least, has had much less influence
than the demand for more explanation quoted above.
140. Manufacturers' comments must be significant enough to step over a threshold
requirement of materiality before any lack of agency response or consideration be-
comes of concern. The comment cannot merely state that a particular mistake was
made in a sampling operation; it must show why the mistake was of possible sig-
nificance in the results of the test.
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In that
opinion the court also identified points raised in industry comments that EPA had not
responded to satisfactorily and would have to address on remand. Id. at 396-99.
141. [C]hallenges to standards must be limited to points made by petitioners in
agency proceedings. To entertain comments made for the first time before this court
would be destructive of a meaningful administrative process.
Id. at 394. See note 150 infra.
142. See Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194 (1931) (Hughes, C.J.); Panama Ref. Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 447 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting, noted in dictum that a "quasi
judicial officer" or an "administrative agency" ".may be required by reviewing courts
to express their decision in formal and explicit findings to the end that review may be
intelligent.")
Where formal administrative hearings are concerned, the Administrative Procedure
Act requires "[a]ll decisions, including initial, recommended, and tentative decisions" to
include "findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material
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closed seems necessary to the idea of decisionmaking on a record, and
has long been explicitly required. 143 Finally, the rule that objections
must be raised before the initial decisionmaker or not at all was
settled for trial courts before there were agencies, and was adopted
early in the history of administrative adjudication. 44
The application of these requirements to informal rulemaking
would "proceduralize" rulemaking by making more of it take place
under procedures which can be ignored only at the risk of adverse
legal consequences on review. This would give more influence to
those at the working level of rulemaking, both in the agency and in
industry, who actually execute those procedures. Rules would stand
or fall on the basis of the data, reasoning and arguments which they
chose to emphasize when the rule was being made. Since these groups
tend to be most familiar with the detailed technical' questions in-
volved, this seems a welcome development in itself.'4 5
The procedural reforms required by Portland Cement and its prog-
eny are largely aimed at improving the logic and coherence of agency
rulemaking, thus making judicial review easier. The administrative
record is not mentioned. Nevertheless, the nature of the record will
be affected by these reforms, and in a way that underlines their benefi-
cial effect. Indeed, the guidelines laid down by Judge Leventhal would
address the way the documentation behind a rule is assembled and
organized more directly than anything which EPA, at least, has issued
to date.140
To the extent that the spirit of these opinions is followed, even a
record assembled on a historical basis would include an increasing
"procedural" component. If more and more of the work of rulemak-
issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record." 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (Supp. III
1973). The legislative history strongly emphasizes this requirement. See SENATE JUDICIARY
Cost,., supra note 12, at 210-11, 273. See also 2 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 16.05 (1958).
143. See, e.g., Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1936)
(Cardozo, J.).
144. See Spiller v. Atcheson, T. & S. F. Ry., 253 U.S. 117, 130 (1920); United States
ex rel. Vatjauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927); Unem-
ployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155 (1946); Verkuil, supra note
28, at 236-37, 239-40.
145. Such detailed analysis of facts and arguments will not yield its full benefits,
however, if it is not set within and shaped by a structure of policy choices. Judge
Friendly has described at length the waste and confusion that result when those with
the power to make such choices-agency heads and Congress-abdicate the responsibility
to make them. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 10.
To date this has not been a problem at EPA. The governing statutes are so sweeping
and articulated in such detail that the agency has had all it can do simply to attempt to
put them into effect.
146. Furthermore, agencies are likely to adhere to legally required procedures more
faithfully than to procedures which they have set up on their own for internal purposes.
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ing must be done under binding procedures prior to litigation, more
of the documents in a historical record will identifiably have their
origin in one of the stages of those procedures. The number of docu-
ments that simply appear for the first time when counsel reviews the
agency's files after litigation has begun will be correspondingly re-
duced.
All this, however, is a side effect of the Portland Cement reforms
sketched above. If the function of the rulemaking record is squarely
faced, more can be accomplished. First, although the Portland Cement
cases in effect specify categories of documents that mast go into the
record, they nowhere state what may not go into it. All the pressures
described above, therefore, continue to ensure that if, in defending
litigation, agency lawyers come across any document which they would
have included in the record before Portland Cement, they will put
it in anyway. This occurs even though the advantage to the agency
of including documents that have not been disclosed for comment
has become much less certain. In practice, the courts continue to often
consider these new documents and new arguments raised by the pe-
titioners at the litigation stage. 1 47
B. A Proposal for Reform
What still is needed is reform aimed explicitly at assembling a
focused record for agency decisionmaking which, like a trial court
record, could become the record for review without further action.
No inquiry would then be necessary into whether the "agency" ac-
tually had "considered" the documents in the record, or whether they
passed some test of relevance, any more than this is generally done in
the course of appellate review of trial court decisions.
The specific reforms I suggest follow.' 48 Their common aim is to
move rulemaking records as far as possible toward the "procedural"
147. See pp. 71-72 S. note 127 supra. Indeed, there is some conceptual trouble with
a court's declining to consider such documents so long as the record is not more clearly
defined. Portland Cement arguably requires only that the inost relevant central docu-
ments be disclosed during the rulemaking, and that responses be made to the most
relevant public comments. Though this is a great improvement over the prior state of
affairs, it is still true that what appears most relevant at the stage of judicial review may
not be what appeared most relevant during the rulemaking and that parties' perceptions
of what is most relevant may differ in good faith. When such a misunderstanding
arises, the impulse will be great for the court to consider the questions involved even
though they were not raised in the proper manner. Though a complete solution to this
problem is clearly impossible, a tighter definition of the record might mitigate it
substantially.
148. These reforms parallel those suggested by Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1333-36.
See also Currie 9: Goodman, supra note 35, at 42-48.
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end of the spectrum without reimposing the adjudicatory hearing re-
quirements that have done so much damage in the past.
First, a rulemaking docket would be established for each proposed
rule. This could consist in most cases simply of a labeled, publicly ac-
cessible file drawer. A room in agency headquarters would be set
aside for these files and, most important, an adequate and organized
staff assigned to keep them in order. 140 Where appropriate, duplicate
files might be set up in other places.
Second, at the time the rule was first proposed in the Federal Regis-
ter, all documents which the agency decided were of central relevance
to the rule would be placed in the file. To ensure that these documents
actually had been critically reviewed and were not dumped in for what-
ever help they could give, each one would have to be discussed in the
preamble to the proposed rule or in the accompanying technical sup-
port document.
Third, all public comments received during the comment period
and all transcripts of hearings held concerning the proposal would
likewise be placed in the comment file upon receipt by the agency.
Fourth, all documents which became available after the proposal
had been published and which the agency decided were of central rele-
vance to the rulemaking would likewise be placed in the file. If
the documents were important enough, the present requirements of
Portland Cement might call for an extension of the comment period,
or even for the proposal of an amended rule.
Fifth, to ensure that the public comments, hearing transcripts and
postproposal documents had been considered, all important issues
raised in them would once again have to be discussed in the preamble
to the final rule or in the accompanying technical support document.
Sixth, the final rule, with its support document, would close the
file. The contents of the file would be the exclusive record for ju-
dicial review.150 Nothing that had not properly been placed in the
file would be considered by the court.
149. The program offices cannot be expected to keep adequate files. Their interest
will be in getting the rule out more than in how that is done. Only a separate unit with
a bureaucratic interest in the recordkeeping procedures themselves can be expected to
enforce those procedures properly.
150. By foreclosing the raising of new issues and the addition of new documents to
the record, this proposal and the Portland Cement cases may seem to penalize the less
sophisticated among those regulated who might prefer to wait until they are directly
threatened with enforcement orders before challenging rules. Viewed realistically, how-
ever, these reforms will not materially affect the high premium already awarded a
regulated industry for being cohesive, well-organized and bureaucratically sophisticated.
An effective challenge to a technical regulation at whatever stage cannot be ac-
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The central problem with rulemaking "records" currently certified
to the courts is that no one knows exactly what they consist of until ju-
dicial review is well under way. As shown above, this may lead either
to inclusion of far more documents than are needed to understand
complished simply by sending a few thousands or tens of thousands of dollars to a
Washington law firm. The industry must also be ready to generate and provide the
agency with technical and economic information that bears on the rule. Thus, during
the development of "effluent guidelines" for discharges of hot water from steam electric
power plants, the industry filed elaborate studies on (1) the cost of installing and
operating cooling towers, (2) the problems of fitting them on existing power plants,
and (3) the impact of their installation on the economic position of the power industry,
the price of electricity and utility fuel consumption. These studies were prepared in
some cases by the industry, and in some by consulting firms especially hired for the
purpose. Plainly such elaborate participation in agency decisions requires a deep purse,
an early decision to start spending, and a substantial existing base of data about the
subjects of the rulemaking. That data, in turn, will generally exist only if the industry
is either highly concentrated or is already regulated to some large degree.
By contrast, when EPA cancelled the use of such poisons as cyanide and strychnine
against livestock predators, see 37 Fed. Reg. 5718 (1972), the chemical companies that
make these products did not protest because only a very small part of their income was
affected. None of the thousands of individual poison users-largely sheep farmers-
protested either, even though by protesting they could have forced reexamination of
the EPA decision in a formal adjudicatory hearing. See 7 U.S.C. § 135d (1970). Their
daily lives were presumably too remote from the government for them to realize what
might happen to them and what they could do about it.
A more active trade association could have alerted its members more quickly to what
was happening. But even if a hearing had been requested, the sheep farmers would not
have been able to participate anywhere near as thoroughly or as effectively as the electric
power industry did where regulations affecting it were concerned. To do so they would
have had to submit detailed studies of the true feeding habits of predators under dif-
ferent conditions and their aggregate impact on the industry, and studies of the ag-
gregate effectiveness and actual and potential side effects of the banned poisons
and any alternatives to their use. In all probability at least some of these studies wotIld
take years to complete unless a significant amount of the data were available already-
far longer, in other words, than any reasonable regulatory scheme could allow. Their
great expense would have to be met by individual assessment of thousands of individual
sheep farmers. It is hard to see how much of this could be accomplished without grant-
ing an expanded trade association or some alternative body such as the Department of
Agriculture far more power over the individual livestock producer than would ever have
been anticipated in the past.
Many of the regulatory programs that cause this discrimination in favor of size not
only have good intentions, but good or even necessary effects. Abandonment of regula-
tion, then, is not the answer. To some extent, smaller businesses may find a greater
degree of political relief available than huge corporations are likely to. And a responsible
agency, of course, should take initiatives of its own to inform such people of what is
intended and what the open questions are. Beyond this, however, I believe some tendency
to favor the large and well-organized is inevitable given the increasing complexity of
the problems that government addresses. There is simply no way for small producers to
deal with a regulatory proposal that incorporates information and judgments going far
beyond their individual ability to question without taking on some of the organized
bureaucratic characteristics of the regulatory agency itself.
The reforms I suggest, then, would simply recognize this unfortunate fact and plovide
a more responsible forum for those who are equipped or have equipped themsehes to
participate in the regulatory process. Indeed, as discussed in the text below, they might
provide some modest assistance to members of the regulated public by making the data
on which rules are based more quickly and more publicly available.
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the rule or to exclusion of documents that have a legitimate bearing
on it. Under the system I suggest, that problem would largely disap-
pear. Both sides would be forced by the threat of adverse legal con-
sequences'" to make their contributions to a clearly defined record
while rulemaking was in process, and that record could then be sent
to the court. The court would know that all the documents before
it had been available to all participants in the rulemaking.
To a large extent this requirement that a binding record be estab-
lished in rulemaking is simply a formal procedure for implementing
the guidelines laid down in Portland Cement. Its effect should not
be underestimated on that account. It is precisely the lack of such
procedures that has led to the failure by the courts to appreciate and
enforce the full impact of Portland Cement's rather abstractly worded
requirements and the failure of the agency to focus the attention of
each of its elements tightly on the material supporting a rule before
that rule is promulgated. Establishment of such a procedure, by con-
trast, will create the only context in which the requirements of that
case will be enforced in a consistent and believable way.
With a central docket, it would be possible for the first time to as-
sign a precise though still somewhat artificial meaning to the term
"considered by the agency." It could be used to describe the contents
of the file, on the ground that these are the documents wlhich the
agency had a duty to consider. With the record thus limited, each
office in the agency and each outside party interested in the rule
could look to the file to see what the rule was based on; each would
be working with the same information when it expressed its views.
This common basis of discussion should make it easier to recognize
which questions were still open and which had been resolved.
Similarly, the Portland Cement requirement that documents be
"disclosed" can present practical problems at present. They may be
disclosed to one party in interest but not to another, or disclosed to
one party earlier than to another. Although this is probably inevitable
in any agency that tries to operate openly and can occur even where
there is no motive to favor one person over others, establishment of
151. On the agency's side, though the fear of court defeats would indeed be tile
ultimate motive for care in assembling the record, actual results would follow only
when the reforms suggested were incorporated into the bureaucratic outlook and proce-
dures of the agency. Most probably this would occur in stages. At first, the General
Counsel's office would take the lead in explaining and, where necessary, enforcing the
new procedures. Later, the new office established to keep these records would gain knowl-
edge and authority, and would take over much of the task. Finally, the program offices
themselves would learn what was required and the need for outside monitoring of their
performance would decrease.
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a central file at least would provide a check by setting up a minimum
measure of information made available to the public generally.
Finally, if such reforms were adopted courts might be more willing
than they have been to enforce the rule suggested in Portland Cement
that points must be raised before the agency if they are to be raised
during judicial review. The lack of coherence and definition of the
present rulemaking system makes courts reluctant to do this in prac-
tice, though they may be well aware of the good reasons for it in
principle.
152
V. The Use of A Discovery System in Rulemaking
A main goal of the reforms suggested above is to make records
shorter and more organized. If under the proposed procedures the
agency alone were allowed to determine which of its internal docu-
ments would be included, that achievement would be easy. In all
likelihood, the reforms would allow exclusion of the mass of periph-
eral material-letters, working drafts, trip reports and the like-for
whose exclusion there seems at present no principled basis.
152. Some practical problems with such an approach call be foreseen, but the) do
not appear to rise to the level of serious objections to it. To take one example, the
scientific or technical documents which the agency includes in the record when rule-
making begins (which I will call "first tier documents") will often cite and in part rel)
on many other less centrally relevant documents ("second tier documents"), which in
turn will cite to and rely on others ("third tier documents"), and so forth. Presumably
only the first tier documents will be included in the administratihe record. Yet even if
a conscientious effort is made to put all the most important documents in this category,
comments may well focus on a second or third tier document in particular cases. When
this happens, should reproposal be required simply because that document was not
originally part of the administrative record, exen though later comment revealed it was
probably important enough to have been included? I see no reason for such a rule.
All the second and third tier documents will presumably be publicly available, and
the mere fact of their direct or indirect citation in the first tier documents should be
enough to put interested parties on notice of their relevance. If comments centered on
such a document, then it should be added to any record certified to a reviewing court.
But there would be no policy reason for a reproposal.
Different questions would arise where, in promulgating a rule, the agency wanted to
rely on conclusions reached in a prior rulemaking. How deeply and in what manner
should the factual support for that prior rule be probed? In some cases judicial review
of the prior rule will simply not be available, either because it can only be challenged
in a different forum or because the time limit for seeking review has lapsed. But where
the court has jurisdiction, some probing of that prior rule should be undertaken, though
there might well be a stronger presunption of its validity if it had survived and been
relied on for a number of years. If that prior rule was promulgated through use of an
administrative docket system such as is suggested here, the relevant file should simply
be cross-referenced. If it wasn't, the record for the new rule should contain or reference
material relevant to the old one. The courts already appear to be following roughly this
course. Compare the discussion of EPA's "Appendix J" method for calculating necessary
reductions in hydrocarbon emissions in Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 294-95, 297-301 (5th
Cir. 1974), with South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 662 n.20 (lst Cir. 1974)
(judicial review of the underlying rule held precluded because limited by statute to
D.C. Circuit).
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But the judgment here cannot be left entirely to the agency. First,
the availability of the Freedom of Information Act prevents it. Second,
if it were, there could be no assurance that the agency would volun-
tarily include material adverse to its position, especially where the
material contained unpalatable facts and discussions of policy, or em-
barrassing revelations of agency motives. This latter problem can be
dealt with if the FOIA, already used in rulemaking to some extent,
is used as the cornerstone of a more elaborate procedure for dis-
covery during the rulemaking proceeding prior to judicial review. 1'
The mechanics of such a system could be simple. While considering
a rule, the agency would stand ready to make available all material in
its possession that might be thought relevant to the proposed rule, as
long as its disclosure was required by the Fr eedom of Information Act.
In addition, at the time a rule was proposed, the agency would include
a limited amount of material in the record. Any person who thought
that additional material should be in the record could then submit it
as part of their comments on the proposal. Since all definitions of the
record agree that such comments are part of it, the material would
be automatically included. By the same token, if such a system were
formally established, the agency would be in a much stronger position
to resist belated demands to supplement the record from those who
had slept on their rights during the rulemaking.
As a practical matter, at least in EPA rulemaking, voluntary com-
pliance with requests to disclose would probably be adequate to sub-
stantially protect the interests of the industry. The same factors which
cause the agency to include everything in historical records at present
would cause it to make full disclosure to the industry during rule-
making.1 54
Although the present ad hoc system generally has resulted in a
satisfactory degree of disclosure, the adoption of a more formal pro-
cedure for creating rulemaking records offers a good opportunity to
adopt a system of discovery which is more explicit and predictable.
In addition, the increased legal significance of timely access to docu-
ments under the proposed system arguably entitles interested persons
153. There is no constitutional requirement that opportunity for disco, cry be afforded
the regulated parties in agency proceedings. See Friendly, supra note 26, at 1279-93. Nor
does Portland Cement require one, for it only forbids the basing of rules on data
which, in "critical degr-ee" has not been disclosed for comment. 486 F.2d at 393.
On the other hand, ElPA, in common with most federal regulatory agencies, has
statutory information gathering powers that can easily be used for "disco~cry" in rule-
making. See §§ 114 & 208 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-9, 1857f-6 (Supp. III
1973) and § 308 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (Supp. III
1973).
154. See pp. 66-69 supra.
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to a guarantee of such access whether the agency consents or not. The
question then becomes whether the Freedom of Information Act is
capable of forcing the agency to make timely disclosures of damaging
material in all cases. To the extent that the FOIA is incapable of
forcing disclosure, further limitations on the power of agencies would
be an appropriate supplement to the proceduralization of rulemaking
records.
A. 'Limitations of the Freedom of Information Act
The FOIA is incapable of ensuring adequate discovery in two re-
gards: scope of discovery and timeliness of discovery. At present the
scope of FOIA discovery is limited by the § 5 exemption from dis-
closure for "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency
in litigation with the agency."' 1 The legislative history and cases make
clear that this provision was meant to encourage "frank discussion of
legal or policy matters in writing" by preserving the confidentiality
of papers concerning them. 51 Even the purely factual portions of such
documents may be withheld as integral parts of the discussion of policy
when the same factual information is available elsewhere.
5 7
This exemption for agency memoranda is closely related to the
bar announced in Morgan against probing the mental processes of
administrative agencies. Indeed, that the language "memorandums
which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency
in litigation with the agency" is the measure of the FOIA § 5 exemp-
tion, in effect builds the "mental processes" bar into that statute. A
court which does not consider probing mental processes part of its re-
viewing task will hardly read such language as requiring disclosure
of documents for solely that purpose.'5 8 The bad faith or improper
conduct exception to the protection afforded by Morgan in judicial
review has not yet been read into the § 5 exemption. 15 9 Even if the
155. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
156. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965), quoted in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73, 87 (1973).
157. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Previous cases
had a somewhat different emphasis. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91 (1973); Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067.
1079 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
158. See KFC Nat'l Management Corp. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 298, 305 and cases cited
at n.11 (2d Cir. 1974); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 69-70 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
159. The reference to disclosure in litigation in § 5 has been read to describe only
what would be disclosed to a "typical" litigant, not one presenting such special cir-
cumstances. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 S. Ct. 1504, 1516 n.16 (1975).
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industry could make some sort of showing of agency bad faith without
first seeing the damaging documents, § 5 on its face would still allow
the agency to refuse to disclose the documents if it chose to do so.
Since EPA rarely invokes the § 5 exemption, a drastic reduction in
the exemption's scope and in the potential it affords for the suppres-
sion of documents would have no significant adverse effect on the
agency. If no other course were available, a complete repeal of the
§ 5 exemption would do more good than harm. The inhibiting ef-
fect which this would have on communication within the agency
would not be great. Uncertainty about the scope of the § 5 exemption
and the willingness of the agency to invoke it already keeps most
potentially embarrassing communications out of print. Yet I am hesi-
tant to recommend this as the best solution. In reexamining and
reforming the scope of disclosure required by the FOIA and agency
policy, it may be possible to provide some confidentiality to the un-
formed and speculative ideas out of which good ones often grow. That
the absence of a guarantee of confidentiality at present may inhibit the
expression of ideas within the agency is no argument for continuing
that effect in the new discovery system if a way to avoid it without
unfairly suppressing information can be devised.
Although I would prefer to preserve a small exemption from FOIA
disclosure requirements for documents reflecting the early and ten-
tative stages of formulating, criticizing or reworking rules, any bright
line way to accomplish it escapes me. One possible approach-about
which I am not at all confident-might be to take advantage of the
fact that ideas and arguments are usually formulated within discrete
bureaucratic units in an agency. Only a document which leaves its
unit of origin can have an effect on policy, and by the time it leaves,
it will probably have been fairly well thought through. This suggests
that if the agency were divided along functional lines, and all docu-
ments that crossed those lines disclosed automatically, maximum dis-
closure of policy proposals could be combined with minimum inhi-
bition of their preparation. 160
The second and less important inadequacy in the present use of
the FOIA as a discovery device in informal rulemaking is its failure
to guarantee that documents will be disclosed soon enough to allow
the submission of meaningful comments. With binding records and
the present discovery system an agency might be able to deny the
industry an opportunity to thoroughly evaluate the support for a given
160, Such a disclosure policy would probably work toward forcing agencies to develop
and adhere to guidelines for their more discretionary actions as Professor Davis has
suggested. See K. DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY JusTIcE 97-116 (1969).
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rule by keeping secret its deliberations in formulating the rule. As-
suming that the attempt were successful, the industry could not file
its FOIA request for disclosure until the notice appeared in the
Federal Register. Even if the agency did not exhaust FOIA time limits
or force the industry to litigate the request, the 90 day comment period
typically allowed would end before the industry could prepare an
adequate response to most technical rules and their supporting data.
The mechanism for solving this problem, however, already exists.
Although at present comment periods are typically no longer than 90
days, the APA requires that interested persons be extended the "op-
portunity" to comment.161 If a system of binding records were adopted
and an agency attempted to avoid meaningful adverse comment as
described above, the courts could find that a 90 day comment period
did not actually constitute such an opportunity'6 2 and require much
longer periods for comment after the proposal.0 3 One choice for the
agency then would simply be to provide a much longer comment
period initially. If that course would cause undue delay, preproposal
disclosure policies could be adopted to make shorter formal comment
periods adequate. The agency might regularly publish a list of new
documents or of the rules being considered by the working groups.
The agency might even start a preliminary file of centrally relevant
documents in the docket room prior to making the proposal and pub-
lish notice of the opening of the file. This would provide definitive
assurance that such documents had been generally available for com-
ment and not just to those sophisticated and well-connected enough
to learn of their existence and ask for them.
B. Administrative Discovery and the Nature
of the Rulemaking Record
Establishment of an open discovery system would make it possible
for records under the new procedures to grow almost as long as they
do at present. All that would be needed is for the industry lawyer to
resubmit as comments all the documents raked out of the agency dur-
ing discovery. Even granting this potential, however, the record would
still be easier to work with than at present. If the agency had done
its job, the record would fall naturally into two parts. The first, com-
161. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (Supp. III 1973).
162. The same principles which require the disclosure of the agency's data, method-
ology and reasoning could readily be held to require disclosure under circumstances
which permit meaningful adverse comment. See p. 75 supra.
163. In reviewing rules promulgated without an adequate opportunity for comment,
this would be accomplished by requiring a reproposal of the rule and an additional
comment period.
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piled in large part by the agency itself, would contain the central
factual data and analysis supporting the rule, and public comments
addressed to that material. The second, submitted by industry, would
consist essentially of material offered to raise doubts about the agency's
good faith or competence.
Unless the industry lawyer sought to create a large record for its own
sake, the sum of the two parts would be much smaller than current
records. At present the acceptance of a historical approach to rule-
making records has in effect placed the burden on the agency to prove
a negative-that there was an absence of bad faith and irresponsible
risk assessment during the formulation of the rule by the agency. Un-
der the proposed system for the creation of a rulemaking record, the
industry could not depend upon the agency's fear of being accused
of distorting the historical record to cause the inclusion of these docu-
ments. The industry would have had an opportunity to seek FOIA
disclosure and to include these documents itself during the rulemaking.
When judicial review began, the record would be closed. Therefore,
under the new system disclosure of the peripheral documents would
be sought by the industry before final rule promulgation. The only
reason why the industry would include such documents in the record
would be to support an affirmative industry comment that bad faith
or irresponsible decisionmaking was present. There would be no reason
for the industry to include the documents showing an absence of these
defects which the agency includes at present.
If the regulated industries routinely made assertions of bad faith
which were only marginally valid, some useless inclusions of docu-
ments might occur nevertheless. Similarly, an industry might try to
impugn an agency's policy judgment not on the merits but by at-
tempting to show that the way it was developed internally was ir-
responsible. As a practical matter, however, this poses no significant
threat of undermining the benefits which the proposed system would
generate. Courts cannot be expected to be very sympathetic to argu-
ments alleging bad faith unless they at least appear to have substantial
support. Similarly, if an agency's statement of reasons for a rule has
survived both passage through the procedures described above and
the substantive comments of the regulated industry, courts will not
be eager to examine in additional detail how the rule arose within
the agency. Concern for their own work loads, for the agency's au-
tonomy, and respect for a limited scope of review will reduce their
willingness to probe too deeply here. For these reasons, documents in
the second stage of the record will probably be looked over rather
quickly to see if any serious doubts are raised. Knowing this, it may
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well seem prudent for industry counsel to refrain from submitting
material which, fairly viewed, does not present substantial support for
their client's position, so as to avoid irritating the court with a mass
of peripheral material. But for such a selflimiting course to be fol-
lowed, the documents must first be disclosed.
164
Conclusion
The legal system is still struggling to adjust to the greatly increased
importance of informal rulemaking. The old notions that such rules
are scarcely subject to judicial review and that the right to a formal
hearing must accompany any significant agency action have for all
practical purposes been abandoned. Instead, agencies tend to use a
number of carefully selected formal procedures in informal rulemak-
ing itself.
To date, however, these procedures have not fully succeeded in
creating an alternative structure for administrative action which can
provide a satisfactory framework both for agency decisions and for
judicial review. The center of any such structure-the record on which
both agency decisions and judicial review should be based-has been
largely overlooked. The time has come to adopt procedures for rule-
making in which a formal record plays a central role. What is needed
is a set of rules for compiling an informal rulemaking record during
the period prior to the adoption of the rule that will also be the record
for judicial review. The adoption of this change would make rule-
making a more efficient and less arbitrary method for government
policymaking.
164. See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (Ist Cir. 1975). In this case,
involving the Boston transportation control plan, one petitioner claimed a portion of
the plan was the fruit of a political deal between the Regional Administrator of EPA
and the Governor of Massachusetts struck before public comments were received. EPA
then made full disclosure of its written communications with the state during the period
in question, which contained no evidence of such an agreement. Though the petitioners
did not drop their argument, neither did they request any of the disclosed documents
to be included in the record. Against this background, the court displayed a notable
lack of interest in the charge. See id. at 675.
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